

The Regional and International Attitude Towards the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait in 1990

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Kuwait was associated with Iraq by special relations ranging from dependence and association. During the Ottoman era, Kuwait was a district of the Basra Province. However, this Ottoman sovereignty was nominal because of British influence in the Gulf, which dates back to 1899 when the sheikhs of Kuwait and several other Gulf emirates signed protection treaties with Britain. They became the sheikhs following the British policy under its protection, which brought Kuwait to independence in 1961. Independence came immediately after Iraq's claim to annex Kuwait to its territory under the government of Abdul Kareem Qasim. Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations remained and at times fluctuated with tension, especially after the end of the Iran-Iraq war. The relationship is strained because of Iraq's claim to the Gulf States of war compensation, which led to the invasion of Iraqi forces in Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Furthermore, this resulted in an Arab and international crisis that was the result of an international coalition resolution of the UN Security Council to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait by force, which was done by the end of January 1991. This crisis has received great international attention and from most countries of the world. The international media has conveyed the details of the crisis and its developments on a daily basis. Western countries have taken care of this event because of its great influence on the international interests in the Gulf region, particularly because of the oil importance of this region. The crisis has shown that there is an Arab, regional and international rejection of the Iraqi invasion and that it was a serious mistake. Various newspapers, channels and political analysts noted the active contribution of a number of Arab countries, even on the military side, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco and Syria, with reservations from a number of other Arab countries for military action such as Jordan and Yemen, and that the crisis must be resolved politically.

Key words: *Iraq, Kuwait, Gulf War*



Introduction

In the 1980s, the Gulf region witnessed the first long war between the two neighbours, Iraq and Iran, which lasted for eight years. Iraq emerged from it with great military strength, experience and armament, which posed a threat to the interests of the major powers in the region. At the same time, the Iraqi regime tried to spread its influence over the region and led to its defence from the so-called external threats from Iran and Israel. It was expected that the Gulf states would provide assistance and compensation for its losses in the first Gulf War, but the countries of the region did not know the war promised a special dispute between Iraq and Iran. Furthermore, it continued to produce large quantities of oil, which led to a drop in oil prices. Iraq considered this hostile action by the Gulf states, foremost Kuwait, and failed all efforts to resolve the crisis, which ended the invasion of Iraqi forces in Kuwait on 2 August 1990. In this paper we will try to study the circumstances that led to this invasion with a focus on Arab and international attitudes. In particular, according to the British media, especially since Britain was one of the first countries to oppose the Iraqi invasion and actively contributed to the war against it (Dunstan M., ed, 2019).

Iraqi-Kuwaiti Relations Reaching to the Iraqi Invasion

Iraq and Kuwait are linked to ancient relations by virtue of the geographical proximity of the two peoples and the mixing of them. Furthermore, many of the people of Kuwait are of Iraqi origin. There is social, cultural and economic interaction between the two countries. During the Ottoman era, relations began to witness a degree of misunderstanding after the Ottomans took control, especially after the return of Ottoman rule. Iraq and the entry of the Persian Gulf under Ottoman sovereignty, even if it was nominal, included Kuwait within the state of Basra. Also at this time, Britain was in absolute control of the Persian Gulf and exerted pressure on the Ottoman state not to annex Kuwait by force to the province of Basra and it was the effect that Britain signed with Kuwait the protection treaty of 1899 (Majid & Edmund, 2001; Dunstan M., ed, 2019).

After the First World War, the situation changed in the region and the emergence of the nucleus of the formation of the modern states began. The Kingdom of Iraq was declared in 1921, while Kuwait remained an independent emirate under British protection in an attempt to prevent its integration with Iraq, which quickly demanded its national government during the reign of King Ghazi (1933–1939), but it did not take effect until after the death of King Ghazi (Rossiter, 2014). The demands did not end where it was renewed under the government of Nuri al-Said (1885–1958) (Ahmed Muhammed & Sheffeq, 2018), who headed the government after the declaration of the Al-Hashimi Union between Iraq and Jordan on 14 February 1958. Kuwait joined the Union to support it financially, in a move to indirectly



annex it to Iraq, and resulted in the illegitimate failure a few months after the fall of the monarchy in Iraq after the revolution of 14 July 1958 (Karam, 2017) .

The rulers of Kuwait tried to draw closer to the new republican regime announced by the rebels led by Abdul Karim Qasim (1958–1963) (Taylor, 2018) by visiting Abdullah al-Salem al-Sabah in Iraq to congratulate him on the revolution of 25 October 1958 and meet with the leader Qasim, who was a conservative in the meeting and did not issue a joint statement (Taylor, 2018). The relations between Iraq and Kuwait became unclear, which aroused the indignation of Britain, which was linked to Kuwait by a treaty of protection. This led to the British payment of the declaration of independence of Kuwait on 9 June 1961, which was rejected by Abdul Karim Qasim who declared that Kuwait is part of the land of Iraq. The Arab League recognised the independence of Kuwait, who agreed to join the League in July 1961 and to the replacement of Arab forces in Kuwait to protect it instead of British troops (Al-Hamdi, 2015).

This crisis concluded with the end of the reign of Abdul Karim Kassem in the coup of 8 February 1963. During the subsequent period, Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations witnessed a cautious calm during the era of Abdul Salam and Abdulrahman Aref from 1963-1968. Iraq recognised the independence of Kuwait and restored trade and political relations, but the issue of borders was not resolved⁽⁸⁾. This situation continued after Baathists came to power, following their coup on 17 July 1968, despite some attempts at rapprochement. This included the visit of then Crown Prince Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah to Iraq. However, things did not improve because of Iraq's demands in certain areas of Kuwait (Rahman, 2016).

In the early 1980s, the Iran-Iraq war broke out in September 1980 and lasted until 8 August 1988. It was called the First Gulf War, which left more than one million people dead on both sides, in addition to material and economic losses that exceeded 400 billion dollars (Rahman, 2016). Kuwait, as well as the rest of the Gulf countries, provided significant aid to Iraq because of fear of the victory of Iran and its growing ambitions in the Gulf region. After the end of the war, attempts were made to try and convince the Kuwaitis to sign Iraq's border demarcation between the two countries, but the Iraqi government was not ready for that, which was used to exploit the current situation. Iraq has been living through the long war with Iran, which has exhausted its economic potential and tried to compensate it by increasing its oil production and asking the Gulf countries to compensate it financially (Wolfe-Hunnicut, 2018).

The situation has strained relations between Iraq and its Gulf neighbours. Echoing the official statements and the local newspapers of both sides, the accusations were directed at each other, including that Kuwait went beyond Iraqi territory and control of oil wells within the Iraqi borders. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates increased their oil production to reduce



international oil prices. As a result, this policy has cost Iraq 14 billion dollars of material losses (Terrill, 2011). Furthermore, the crisis has turned into the corridors of the League of Arab States, which received several complaints from both sides on mutual accusations, but the crisis escalated despite Arab interventions. The result was the entry of Iraqi forces into Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the control of its territory and the declaration of Kuwait as part of Iraqi territory (Terrill, 2011).

The region entered into a great truth crisis which created a state of internal division among the Arab countries, most of which opposed the control of Iraq over Kuwait. This did not succeed all the efforts and mediation to convince the Arab President of the Iraqi regime to change his decision and withdrawal from Kuwait. This resulted in the issue being placed before the United Nations and the Security Council which issued several quick decisions in which Iraq threatened to comply with international resolutions. This subsequently gave right to the countries that support Kuwait, especially the United States and Britain, to use force to get Iraq out of Kuwait (Cordesman, 2018).

Arab Reactions

The recent Iraqi aggression against the State of Kuwait (Cordesman, 2018) and the occupation of the country were a profound breach of the credibility of the Arab regional system and the international order (Cordesman, 2018). The Arab and international repercussions were a serious crisis and the first of its kind in the Arab regional system, which led to the overlapping of regional and international dimensions (Nachmani, 2018).

The Arab states have divided on themselves. In principle, although most Arab states have declared that they do not accept the invasion, some have supported Iraq. The phenomenon of division is not new to the Arab system. The list of Arab conflicts is long. The intensity of this or that conflict, and its impact on the performance of the regime, depends on the parties to this conflict and on their political, economic and international weight in general (Nachmani, 2018).

The Positions of the Arab Countries Were Divided Among Four Groups Depending on Their Position of Two Factors

First, the extent of the depth and strength of the relationship with the United States of America, before the Extraordinary Summit in Cairo on 9–10 August 1990. American officials met with Saudi and Egyptian leaders to ensure that these leaders agreed to strike Iraq and turn the war from American to Arab-American. Second, the nature of trends in the opinion circles of different countries towards the United States (Freedman, 2010).

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia's position on the crisis can be summed up in several key points:

1. To condemn the invasion and to reject all the consequences of the invasion (Peter W. & Douglas, 2016).
2. Declaring that the Kingdom will not allow anyone to take a stone from its land, as well as occupy it and cut it.
3. Cairo (10 August 1990), the statement of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the resolutions of the Security Council (Peter W. & Douglas, 2016).
4. Demanding the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the return of the legitimate authority of the Government of Kuwait under the leadership of Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah and the return of the situation to what it was before the second of August.
5. Withdrawal of the Iraqi crowds stationed on the borders of the Kingdom while ensuring that the Iraqi aggression against any other Arab Gulf country is not repeated.
6. Call the Arab and Islamic forces and friendly ones to support the Saudi forces in the defence of the Kingdom.

The position of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait came as a surprise to King Hussein (El-Khawas, 2016). He spoke with Saddam directly and flew to Alexandria for an emergency meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (Ryan, 2018). The two agreed that the issue must be resolved within the Arab family without interference from outside and appealed to King Hussein to go to Baghdad as soon as possible. He supported King Fahd, who was consulted by telephone (Ryan, 2018).

King Hussein told President Bush he was about to go to Saudi Arabia and Iraq. "I ask you, sir, to keep your calm, and we would like to deal with this issue in the Arab context to find a way to establish a better future," he said (Ryan, 2018).

The next day, August 3, King Hussein flew to Baghdad in the morning to meet Saddam Hussein. King Hussein received Saddam's approval to resolve the dispute within the Arab framework by attending a mini summit in Jeddah on August 5 and informing King Hussein of the details of his withdrawal before his plane landed in Amman. However, Saddam stubbornly refused to respond positively to the proposals of the leaders of the three Arab countries, except in the case the Arab League distanced itself from condemning Iraq.

When King Hussein returned to Amman, he called Mubarak to inform him of the success of his mission and found the situation had changed. In fact, when King Hussein was on his way



to Baghdad, the Egyptian government issued a statement condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (Lynch, 2006). King Hussein contacted Mubarak to inform him of the agreement he had reached and to express his dissatisfaction with the Egyptian statement. Mubarak said he spoke with King Fahd about the situation, rejected the understandings reached by King Hussein and insisted on the unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the immediate return of the Kuwaiti ruling family to its position at the top of power (Lynch, 2006).

In less than two days, Iraq's condition of the non-conviction and non-bringing of foreign troops had been met, and dialogue with Iraq had frozen. King Hussein's credibility as a negotiator has been undermined, as had the access to an Arab solution. King Hussein was deeply hurt when he learned of the arrival of US forces in Saudi Arabia. The conflict overnight turned into an international crisis, placing America and its allies against Iraq (Lynch, 2006).

The imposition of sanctions by the Security Council on Iraq through resolution 661 has had devastating consequences for Jordan. The first blow to the Jordanian economy was the large influx of refugees expelled from the Gulf.

King Hussein's popularity at home reached the peak and the vast majority of Jordanians, both in the country and in the army, who sympathised with the Iraqi people (Ryan, 2018). For the first time in Jordan's history, the regime allowed and even encouraged anti-Western demonstrations in public places. The Muslim Brotherhood was fully mobilised to rally public support for the king's policy of anti-Western military intervention in the Gulf. The Gulf crisis was one of the few chapters in the history of Jordan in which almost complete agreement was reached between the positions of the regime, the army, parliament and public opinion (Baram, 1994). At the same time, King Hussein secretly met with Israeli leaders in London (Swanson, 2019) in an attempt to avoid exploiting the Jordanian airspace as a battleground between Iraq and Israel.

The population has been achieved to King Hussein at home, at the expense of a majority of his relations with the West (Swanson, 2019). The West was aware that Iraq and Jordan were allies, necessitating a more pragmatic foreign policy. However, the good will of the West was largely hampered by Jordan's financial support for Saddam in avoiding UN sanctions and what was seen as the failure of King Hussein's leadership in the early days of the crisis (Jenkins, 2019). There was a feeling that if the king had thought more cleverly, he would have discovered that the real interest of Jordan was to join the rest of the international community against those who violated the law. King Hussein could have told his people that acceptance of the occupation of territory by force was crucial for Jordan, and Jordan's position on the current crisis was based on that principle. Saddam did not expect any moral or material support from Jordan (Jenkins, 2019).

The Egyptian Attitude

The Arab Republic of Egypt was one of the Arab governments that played a clear role in solving the crisis, as the crisis put Egyptian policy in a dilemma and forced a choice between two Arab countries with which Egypt has good relations; Iraq belongs to the Arab Cooperation Council which Egypt belongs to and Egypt also has good relations with Kuwait (Vierling & Amy, 2018).

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Mubarak sided with the US attitude. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a strong shock to Mubarak's foreign policy (Michael & Jongsoo, 1995), who was promised by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein before the invasion that Iraq would not do so. While Mubarak supported the policy of sanctions as a basic framework for international dealing with the problem, he also provided military support to the coalition forces, which was designed to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait by the January 1991 war. They contributed material and moral aid to Kuwait (Hinnebusch, 2016).

Yemen Attitude

The crisis in the Gulf has had a profound impact on the Yemeni-Gulf relations, particularly since Yemen had just joined the northern and southern parts of Yemen to emerge as a new country, which was surprised by this crisis (Petouris, 2019), especially in the Gulf states. Accordingly, measures of a punitive nature were adopted, such as the abolition of all economic privileges granted to expatriates by the Gulf States and the launching of information campaigns against the Yemeni citizen, and thus strained Yemeni-Gulf relations (Petouris, 2019).

The Yemeni situation has crystallised from the Gulf crisis as follows:

1. Non-approval of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its annexation by force and demand that Iraq withdraw from it.
2. Refusal of foreign military intervention in the region and work to resolve the issue within an Arabic frame.
3. Condemn the military action against Iraq, which was aimed at the destruction of the emerging Iraqi military force (Farwell, 2017).

Turkish Attitude

Turkey joined the media campaign led in particular by the United States and its Western allies, which were attacked by Iraq prior to the August 1990 invasion. The Turkish

government and press also raised a furore over the confiscation of parts of what was known as the giant⁽⁵¹⁾ cannon that Iraq reportedly built (şeri, 2016).

Between August 1990 and October 1991, Turkey undertook a series of measures against Iraq⁽⁵³⁾. It increased the number of troops stationed on the border with Iraq to 100,000, after sending approximately 35,000 additional troops to join the 65,000 troops deployed in the south eastern region on the border with Iraq (şeri, 2016).

On 14 August 1990, Ozal took a decision from the parliament to grant the government of Yildurm Akbolut (Nachmani, 2018), the then-existing list, special powers entitling the right to send Turkish troops out of the country and without returning to the House of Representatives. The powers that Yildirim sought under Article 92 of the Constitution were "The right to send Turkish troops abroad, to receive foreign forces, to declare war, to use the armed forces and the Turkish territory for military purposes and other matters that fall under the terms and conditions of war" (Nachmani, 2018).

The Turkish government announced its readiness to send Turkish troops to the Gulf region "under the pretext of contributing to the implementation of the Security Council's economic embargo against Iraq" and allowed US aircraft to use the Incirlik and Battman bases in the military operations against Iraq, US intelligence information they have about Iraqi forces, military areas and the announcement of important coordination in this area (Nachmani, 2018). In an interview with CNN on 24 September 1990, Ozal focused on three factors (Sever, 2001):

First: The Turkish attitude, which he described as "positive" from the resolution of the international embargo against Iraq, forming the basis on which the rest of the countries implemented the resolution.

Second: This attitude cost Turkey huge economic losses. As Ozal said, "There are oil pipes that transport more than 50% of Iraq's oil. That costs us a lot, but we have no other choice" (Sever, 2001).

Third: the United States and the concerned parties must bear the cost of compensating the Turkish economic losses and their attitude should be practical (the clouds and the storms are many, but the rain has not been coming down yet)

GCC Attitude

The invasion of Kuwait was a major challenge for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It was surprised by the invasion and threatened by an unprecedented security threat (Osman,

2011). This did not prevent the building of a unified Gulf position in its basic lines and collective political movements. The Council initiated a kind of general mobilisation against the sources of threat and helped it to be the most stable and complete assembly of its constituent structure, compared to other Arab regional groupings on the eve of the invasion. The crisis has made the Council more coherent under the common sense of danger (Winckler, 1997). By following the Council's moves towards the Gulf crisis, the GCC states were active during the post-invasion period politically, economically and militarily, both internationally and regionally, in order to maintain the foreign military build-up and the international consensus against the Iraqi invasion (Winckler, 1997).

Since the beginning of the crisis, the policy guidelines of the GCC countries have crystallised in the following areas:

1. To respond to the Iraqi aggression and prevent it from attacking other countries.
2. The evacuation of the occupation forces on Kuwaiti territory, and the liberation with the return of the legitimate rule.
3. Emphasis on foreign forces in the region are not an occupying force, as some analysts have said, but it supports the Gulf States and protects their territories and their presence temporarily.

As part of the diplomatic move (Foad, 2009), the diplomatic activity of GCC ministers at the international and regional levels has emerged to ensure support for the response and isolation of the Iraqi aggression in the light of international resolutions and the illegality of the occupation of Kuwait. The Gulf diplomacy has also defined its objectives, which can be called the main bases of the Gulf Cooperation Council. They were announced by the Secretary General of the Council Abdullah Bishara after meeting with the US Secretary of State and that the positions of the US and Gulf were identical in the following points (Kapiszewski, 2017):

1. The need to implement international resolutions in all their aspects, and that there is no such thing as a partial solution or a phased solution.
2. No compromise on the two basic conditions upon which any peaceful endeavour is based: withdrawal and the return of legitimacy.
3. The door remains open to diplomatic and political solution to be balanced with economic and psychological pressure and the isolation of Iraq internationally and regionally, in order to achieve these conditions by peaceful means.
4. The parties reaffirm the importance of serious consideration of additional measures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, together with further economic and political sanctions, such as the severance of diplomatic relations and the taking of actions against diplomatic and Iraqi missions .

Since the early days of the invasion, coordination between the GCC countries has started to go even further in the direction of the earlier plans. However, it has been agreed to accelerate the implementation of the unified economic agreement, while shortening the dates of achieving the remaining steps of the agreement. Including, the unification of customs tariffs and value added in the GCC States (Kapiszewski, 2017).

After the invasion, a tripartite committee comprising Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar was formed to agree on the way of the assistance provided by the GCC member states to the countries affected by the crisis, as well as the agreement to reduce the negative effects of the crisis. This included the mutual acceptance of each central bank of the currencies of the GCC countries, and at the same price, which restored stability after the sudden panic and rush towards withdrawing deposits from the Gulf banks. It also agreed on the continuation of arrangements related to the Kuwaiti dinar, loyalties leading to the acceptance of Gulf banks, and the conversion of certain Kuwaiti dinar from Kuwaiti families or members of an estimated amount of about five hundred dinars for one time.

At the military and security levels, the Security Council has taken great care. Particularly in light of new circumstances resulting from the Iraqi invasion and the fear of it resorting to internal sabotage operations, in the event of the outbreak of military operations or as a prelude to it. The Council took many measures to confront any emergency situations threatening the internal security of its states, especially the fact that the majority of the population is based on expatriate workers of different nationalities (Winckler, 1997), which explains the initiative of some GCC states to deport some of their employees in the civil and military fields of certain nationalities; notably, Yemen, Jordan and Palestine, granted as in the case of Yemenis or by way of ending contracts, or refusing to renew them to other nationalities. Although the internal security situation has been established, there has been some general concern and caution required in such circumstances.

On the military front, the GCC heads of state held a meeting in Riyadh on 11 August 1990 to approve unified plans for the armed forces of the GCC states in the face of possible developments and coordination on the reception of friendly and brotherly forces that were brought to the region.

The Ministers of Defence of the GCC States held an extraordinary meeting in Riyadh on 22 August 1990, in which the military situation in the region was discussed, in addition to the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff. At the end of their meeting the following were supported:

A. Support and release of Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation in the international framework.

B. Make the most of the facilities located in the Gulf region for the liberation of Kuwait.

The Iranian Attitude

The invasion of Kuwait was viewed as a golden opportunity by the Iranians to break out of their international isolation. Since the invasion, the emergence of Gulf-Iran relations has been marked by a positive shift in relations. It can be said that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait contributed to crystallising the conviction of the Gulf Cooperation Council's effort to play the dominant role in the affairs of the Gulf and that participation and cooperation are the best ways forward after the experience of the Iraq-Iran war (Kamel, 2015).

Iran's Supreme National Security Council condemned the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in its statement on 13 August 1990 and demanded an unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait. In such circumstances and in an attempt by the Iraqi regime to secure Iran's complete neutrality, the Iraqi government announced in mid-August 1990 an initiative directed at Iran consisting of the following points (Kamel, 2015):

1. Reaffirmation of the 1975 Algiers Agreement on the Shatt al-Arab, which was rejected by the Iraqi president and was the direct cause of the outbreak of the war.
2. Iraq's agreement to return the Iranian family to Iran.
3. Iraq's agreement to supply Iran with quantities agreed upon with Iran.
4. Iraq's agreement to limit the role of the Iranian opposition operating through its territory (MKO).
5. Iraq declares responsibility for the war of eight years and expressed recovery from the payment of compensation (Rezun, 2019).

The Iraqi government was quick to implement these concessions, with the goal of neutralising Iran in its conflict with Kuwait and uniting Iraq and Iran in the face of foreign forces (US-led coalition forces) that have begun to gather in Saudi Arabia and some Gulf Arab states. However, Iran did not care about the Iraqi initiative. It separated between the peace agreement with Iraq and the recent invasion of Kuwait. Iran adhered to UN resolutions and called for peaceful resolution of the crisis and an attempt to end it without war. Further, it declared on 3 December 1990, that it would remain neutral if war broke out (Rezun, 2019).

Iran's neutral attitude on the crisis may be bolstered by the real gains made in Tehran's relations with the West, where the European Community cancelled the economic sanctions imposed on Iran in October 1990. French companies also restored major refinery construction on the island of Kharj (Revenues)⁽⁸⁶⁾.

Conclusions



The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait resulted in several things:

1. The Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations were never one of complete serenity to prevent such an event. Before Iraq's independence in 1961, Kuwait was considered a part of its territory, since it was a district of the Province of Basra in the Ottoman era.
2. Several attempts were made to merge Kuwait with Iraq. The first at the end of the royal era at the invitation of then Prime Minister Nuri al-Said for Kuwait's accession to the Hashemite Union, and the second was a more explicit invitation of Iraqi Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qasim to return Kuwait to Iraq.
3. With periods of cooperation between the two countries, especially during the 1980–1988 Iraqi-Iranian war, relations soon became strained after the end of the war. Iraq's claim to Kuwait to pay for financial compensation as a result of its loss of war, in the defence of Kuwait and the Gulf, and the export of oil, which Iraq considered a war against itself, led to the entry of Iraqi forces in Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and declaration as part of its territory.
4. The Iraqi invasion has received strong regional and international reactions and brought the issue to the UN Security Council, which issued several quick decisions, including the formation of an international coalition to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
5. The positions were quick and clear by Arab and foreign regional states to reject the invasion and its entry into the international coalition against Iraq.
6. International countries also rejected the Iraqi move and cautioned it with a threat to its political and economic interests in the Persian Gulf region and vigorously sought to pass swift UN Security Council resolutions to punish Iraq, including by force.
7. Iraq has received some support from several Arab countries, such as Jordan and Yemen, which refused against the invasion and did not agree to hit Iraq militarily or through an economic blockade.



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