

Democracy and Beyond in Iraq: A Critical Analysis of Jonathan Holmes' *Fallujah*

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This study is an attempt to investigate the role of theatre in shaping the attitudes of people towards political issues. *Fallujah*, which was written and directed by Jonathan Holmes in 2007, was employed as a sample to investigate Iraqis' attitudes towards American theory involving democratic models. This work uses a survey as a tool to measure theatres' influence on the ability to convince people. The outcomes showed that the Iraqis want a strongly democratic political model and vice versa, varied from previous autocratic common regimes in the Middle East but away from American aims.

Key words: *Arabic political thinking, Ba'ath Model, Autocratic values, democracy, Fallujah.*

Introduction

Theatre can be described as a collective arrangement of artistic activities that employs live artists in order to show the familiarity of an actual or fictional prior occasion in the presence of spectators in stage (Carlson, 1986). It handles social, ethic, economic and political issues, and it provides an exclusive forum for the political by connecting spectators in a noticeable, if temporary, social genuineness through the activation of its customs. Theatre is a place that can collect people and grant them an exclusive opportunity in order to watch and study symbols of their community, offered to them in a live performance. Basically, theatre has not been restricted by direct limits; it is considered an appropriate environment for highlighting life difficulties, sightseeing concerns, supporting achievement in community or individual life, in addition to investigating with altered relationships of authority in the interior context of a method that contributes in the public directly and indirectly (Schechner, 1985).

Theatre's specific influence depends on several crucial factors: touching space, spectators, alive pictures offered within a specific period, and the performance of artists. The emotional

interaction between the actual actor and the fictitious character provides theatre the quality of abstruseness or bewilderment in order to point to a location in a boundary area of experience and consciousness (Turner, 1982). Moreover, other researchers have emphasised that theatre uses the quality of abstruseness with spiritual and communal ceremonies involved in the creation and conservation of the individual and the community personality. Modern theatre links this powerful emotional interaction with an available work freedom, especially in European democratic atmospheres where theatre might handle unlimited topics on stage. Since the attending of theatre is an optional and aware performance, presently theatre has not been restricted, for example by being placed on TV. Thus, its influence has increased consistently (Fischer-Lichte, 2002).

This work investigated *Fallujah*, a play which was written and directed by Jonathan Holmes, one of the famous English contemporary directors. The play was shown at the Old Truman Brewery London in 2007. In this research, it was examined as a study case of measuring theatre's influence on public opinion associated with the American intervention in Iraq in 2003 for holding a democratic model, as per early statements of the American administration headed by President Bush. Holmes used theatre as a means to tell the story of Fallujah because it is worthy: "It became clear that . . . the story of Fallujah needed to be told . . . I wanted the accounts of witnesses to some of the most serious crimes committed during an atrocious war to be heard by audiences unaware, in the main, of those crimes" (Holmes, 2007). Theatre, thus, can be described as a social, cultural, and political translator. Therefore, it is necessary for scholars to offer briefly, at least, some of the conceptions which significantly contributed in a formulation of the Arabic (in general) and Iraqi (particularly) personality in order to illustrate the nature of attitudes adapted by people towards American values.

Consequently, the study includes a brief investigation about the characteristics of Arab political thinking, the nature of political regimes in Arabic countries and the Arab Ba'ath Socialist party model in Iraq which dominated in power for over fifty years. Accordingly, the way will be paved for readers and viewers of *Fallujah* to understand adequately the nature of conflict of American forces and the community of Fallujah. It is worthy to mention that Fallujah is a town in the Iraqi city of Al Anbar, situated approximately 70 kilometres west of Baghdad.

Historical View on Autocracy

Until the appearance of the contemporary government, starting with the War of American Independence (1776–1783), most governments were autocratic governments dominated by social group chiefs, or emperors, with the exclusion of the traditional Greek democracies. Despotic rulers have typically been recognised because of the sole supply of genuine power, unless a challenging tyrant was recognised as simply or fortunate or legitimate. The tyrant



isn't restricted by constitutional or in style limitations or by political opposition. If any opposition arises, it is typically not accepted and is eradicated (Downing, 1993; Friedrich, 1965).

The earliest empires worldwide, such as the Babylonians, Egyptians, and Persians, were totally despotic. Diverse periods of ancient China were dominated by people in whom the ability of their social group was targeted. Several autocracies were additionally theocracies as a result of the use of power by a tyrant who was supported by some claim to spiritual right. Until today, autocratic governments existed globally. Some Arab regimes in the Middle East region can be categorised as having an autocratic pattern, despite their power which often seems to be compassionate but is still dreadfully sturdy. This may have organisational benefits, due to resolutions that can usually be accomplished while not having to have interact in shattering clashes with antagonistic parties that can be present in democratic countries (Roller, 2001).

Autocracy and Democracy in Contemporaneousness

A few centuries ago, the Tsars of Russia were the absolutist monarchs of more than 200 years. In Europe, as well as the minor kingdoms of Europe, they were tyrants. The Russian emperors utilised the title despot. The title originated from the Byzantium as an interpretation of emperor. In the modern world, it has been used additionally as a trophy for the Emperor of Japan. Some governors have dominated in an autocratic style, however, with weakened power because of growing limitations. However, the growth of liberal democracy, a fractional revival of parts of Ancient Greek democracy, fetched most of the genetic kinds of autocracy to termination. Interchanging autocracy that places power within the hands of one person is a kind of totalitarianism (Tullock, 1987).

It utilises theoretical parts to recruit the complete population of a state in performing its benefits. In the above-mentioned models, the monarchs have been working on their transformation into autocrats. For instance, on the one hand, Hitler employed beliefs and a party to assemble unconditional authority to become a dictatorial and totalitarian ruler. On the other hand, governors such as Ugandan president Idi Amin Dada and El hajj Omar Bongo Ondimba of Gabun have employed social group power, backed by their personal philosophy, to substantiate their dictatorial domination. Some trendy autocratic governors have adopted the trimmings of democratic lawfulness.

The growth of the democratic model has not completed its antagonism with autocracy. In periods of difficult challenges, people could ask for asylum in autocracy in order to keep peace and opulence, as Thomas Hobbes distinguished, or those with authoritarian characters could trade freedom for dictatorial government. Autocracy will seem evident in

areas of life apart from civil politics. Non secular assemblies or ethnic group life is also ruled by autocratic characters (White, 1960).

Arab Political Thinking

Introduction

Besides spiritual periods, Arab political thinking should be investigated based on particular communal and lawful periods. Arab political thinking has grown in contradiction of three histrionic backgrounds: the growth of Islam and the ultimate absorption of the many Arab lands into the Ottoman dominion (1299–1922); the Western contextual and the colonial experience; and the post-colonial scenery and fashionable Arab statehood. The five historical segments of Arab political thinking comprise the before Ottoman segment; the leading Ottoman segment (1299–1798); the liberal segment (1789–1939); the autonomist segment (1940–1967); and also the recent, after autonomist segment (Abu-Rabi‘, 2004).

Before-Ottoman Arab theorists were deeply affected by the growth of Islam and also the translation of Greek works into Arabic, and they were involved with queries of political groups and the nature of independent power. Al-Farabi, as one of most famous thinkers, advanced a model of the state that was implemented in Europe over seven centuries later. He debated that under unfair circumstances, individuals would meet and comply with reject rights to the ruler who served as a defender of the community. Ibn Jama’a wrote that a ruler might solely preserve authority through force, which community would only admit the ruler if the ruler could use this force. This era was characterised by issues over queries of independence, power, and political organisation, especially, with how these queries may be reunited with numerous faculties of religious jurisprudence (Browers, 2006).

The early Ottoman part was formed by the potent Arab thinker, Ibn Khaldun. In his theory, he connected the growth of the state with the adaptation of the people. In keeping with his conception, as people advanced all over history, it required more and more complicated styles of organisation. The state, he thought, was so close to the people. Arab thinking throughout this part was preponderantly involved with queries of political and spiritual authority and therefore, the obligations of the sovereign to the society. Sayyid Murtada al-Zabidi, for instance, sketched a crucial discrepancy between the lawfulness of the caliphate, that was acquired by spiritual advantage, and the sultanate, that was acquired by military intervention. As a result of the Turkish Empire, throughout this era was a Muslim state, queries regarding the appliance of Islamic law, and the treatment of non-Muslim communities and intra-Muslim relations. In the liberal part, the secularisation of Arab political thinking mirrored the Arab understanding to European colonisation and modernism. This era was outlined by the development of nationalist thinking, that declared that the shared aims of bound teams intended that they fashioned a

political tendency. The main notions of political tendency are distinguished during liberal part: spiritual, regional, and ethno-phonological patriotism (Choueiri, 2000).

This liberal part paved the way to a lot of complicated styles of Arab patriotism that subjugated Arab political ideology until 1967. Arab patriotism adopted Arabs as one traditional, societal, ethnic, and phonological community that ought to be unified within the organisation of a dominant Arab state and sketched on varied philosophic streams, as well as dictatorship and socialism. The current part of Arab political thinking is outlined by crucial features that emerged within the outcome of the loss of Arab armies against Israel in the 1967 war; the breakdown of socialism as a conceptual experience; the disbelieving of profane Arab patriotism that had arisen throughout the liberal part; and therefore, the recombination of spiritual dissertation into conventional Arab political thinking. This up-to-date part, characterised by fashionable, self-governing Arab states, is any outlined by rising communal, economic, and government tendencies within the Arab world, as well as rising population rates, the occurrence of Israel, cumulative Western impingement, the growth of Islamism, and therefore, the persistence of totalitarianism (Hourani, 1983).

The Ba'ath Model in Iraq and Future Consequences

The slogan of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist party talks about unity, freedom and socialism. Thus, its members had been working on achieving their supposed above-mentioned aims. The effective beginning of political activities was in 1958 after they dominated in Iraq, Ba'athists had looked forward to making Iraq a part of the United Arab Republic which contains Egypt and Syria. However, they were disappointed after breaking unity between both countries. In terms of the second target of freedom, the Ba'athists had not hesitated to use the most intensive military forces in order to terminate other parties in Iraq, especially those who adopted different ideologies. Practically, the Arab Ba'ath Socialist party was very opposed to socialism thinking, despite it been supported by socialist states. However, the Ba'athists' philosophy was based on no allowance for other political parties (Abu Jaber, 1966; Baram, 1991).

Based on the above difficult experiences in Iraq, as well as the legacy of governing regimes in Arab counties which have suffered from foreign dominations during long centuries and dictatorial authorities that used religious conception in order to keep their power, Arabic communities have a wide gap with political regimes. People generally do not have enough awareness in new political models because they are used to watching autocratic rulers for long periods. Additionally, some people have been raised and affected by such rulers, therefore, any new political model will need adequate time to present its conceptions and convince the community that, for instance, democracy represents an appropriate choice to ensure their rights and avoid dictatorial models (Devlin, 1976; The Baath Party 1991).



Consequently, scholars can understand the nature of the political atmosphere in Iraq and its neighbours, and the reflections of previous experiences on the peoples' mind in such countries that suffer foreign and military interventions which are mostly comprised of dominated power. Furthermore, in general, the Arab political thinking — which was investigated in section four — has not been ready to interact with the democratic fundamentals, especially after long centuries of Western colonialism. Therefore, it is very easy to conclude the complexity of the new model after 2003 in Iraq (Kaylani, 1972; Marr, 2004).

New Political Model after 2003 in Iraq

A democratic regime is based on systematic guidelines that aim to elect the parliament, which is responsible for establishing the government of a public, via a process of voting competition. After American intervention in Iraq in 2003, President Bush stated, “All Iraqis must have a voice in the new government, and all citizens must have their rights protected” (George, 2003). This claim was launched to absorb the public anger, which mostly adopted a negative attitude towards the American administration, and to motivate the Iraqi community to receive a new political model. At the time, the consensus of American public opinion distinctively perceived that the democratic model would be successful in Iraq and it would stimulate democratic values all over the Middle East (Fallows, 2003).

Nevertheless, doubters such as Adam Garfinkle — who had worked as an academic and high ranking official staff member of the American administration — debated that striving to construct a democratic regime in the Arabic countries would not succeed and it would lead to maximise anti-Americanism in the these countries. Generally, criticisers have offered three associated issues which prevent building a democratic model in Iraq. Firstly, the struggle that suitable replacements to the democratic model are existent for Iraq that, if scarcely perfect, are more practicable and more sufficient in order to guarantee the steadiness of Iraq. Secondly, the claim that the Iraqi community is not prepared adequately for accepting democracy due to the nature of political thinking which was discussed in section four. Finally, criticisers asserted that the conversion to democracy in Iraq would be too unsafe and the ensuing government too fragile. Consequently, the conventional federal form of it would not succeed.

Regardless, both hopeful and pessimistic currents have conceded that creating a democratic model in Iraq will be difficult and unsafe, especially taking into consideration that other models have broken down in spite of the existence of more encouraging conditions. Therefore, constructing a democracy in Iraq will take a long time to reach success. Nevertheless, there is no specific reason to consider that an Iraqi democratic model will not be sustainable (Watkins, 1970).



The opinion that the chronological absence of a democratic experience in Iraq prevents the growth of a democratic regime can be effortlessly disproved by the many successful models that have advanced during the last two decades, despite the absence of a required previous democratic practice. After the second World War, numerous American and European states thought that the German community was unprepared for democracy due to it being traditionally raised on autocratic values. The same opinion was made about several Eastern Asian states, whose Confucian principles are unwelcoming to democracy, whereas, they achieved a noticeable success in their democratic models such as in Japan. Additionally, some experiences have witnessed great and rapid success such as Poland and Estonia (Garfinkle, 2003).

Does Iraq have a Minimum Background to Establish a Democratic Model?

The different social and economic pointers that researchers employ in order to measure the possibility of a successful democratic model also propose that Iraq has a practically respectable groundwork to achieve it. Table 1 shows some measures; revenue, literateness, male-to-female literateness percentage, as well as urbanisation. The numbers of Iraq are equivalent to other countries that have sufficient and actual advancement in the conversion from an autocratic to democratic regime, such as Bangladesh and Bolivia (Robert, 999).

Table 1: Socioeconomic Indicators Linked to Democracy: Selected Countries

Country	Positive Factors				Negative Factors		
	Per Capita GDP (PPP)	Basic Education (Literacy: Percent of population age 15 and higher)				Economic Inequality (Gini Index)	Urban Population (Percent of total)
		Total	Male	Female	Male-Female Gap		
Bangladesh	\$1,750	56	63	49	-14	33.6	22
Bolivia	2,600	83.1	90.5	76	-14.5	58.9	60
East Timor	500	48	NA	NA	NA	38	24
Egypt	3,700	51.4	63.6	38.8	-24.8	28.9	44
India	2,500	52	65.5	37.7	-27.8	37.8	27
Indonesia	3,000	83.8	89.6	78	-11.6	31.7	36
Iraq	2,500	58	70.7	45	-25.7	NA *	75
Kenya	1,000	78.1	86.3	70	-16.3	44.5	29
Jordan	4,200	86.6	93.4	79.4	-14	36.4	71
Mongolia	1,770	97.8	98	97.5	-0.5	33.2	61
Nigeria	840	57.1	67.3	47.3	-20	50.6	40
Panama	5,900	90.8	91.4	90.2	-1.2	48.5	55
Peru	4,800	88.3	94.5	83	-11.5	46.2	71
Philippines	4,000	94.6	95	94.3	-0.7	46.2	54
Romania	6,800	97	98	95	-3	30.5	55
Senegal	1,580	39.1	51.1	28.9	-22.2	41.3	44
Turkey	6,700	85	94	77	-17	41.5	69

Notes: NA = not available

* (High)

Sources: World Bank, *East Timor at a Glance," for East Timor urban population: United Nations InfoNation for urban population of other countries: CIA World Factbook for all other figures.

Iraq, in fact, has numerous qualities that would contribute to a fruitful democratic regime. Specifically, it is possibly the most gifted of any of the Arab countries in terms of both its economic and social characteristics. Besides its massive oil wealth, Iraq has great agricultural latent. Preceding to the Persian Gulf War in 1991, most of its population was possibly the best cultivated and open-minded.



Even though it has been overwhelmed economically for more than a decade due to an economic blockade, Iraq has many professional individuals such as engineers and academics who are able to establish the reviving Iraqi model.

Analysis of political dimension in Jonathan Holmes' *Fallujah*

Jane Perlez argues that Jonathan Holmes, through his play *Fallujah*, “has tried to convey the 2004 assault on Falluja, when the Americans used a ferocious strategy to re-establish control of the town after the massacre of four American contract workers, whose mutilated bodies were dragged through the streets and strung from a bridge” (Perlez, 2007). Therefore, he depended on statements of real characters who were involved in the events in Fallujah in 2004, such as Rana al Aiouby, who is a working cinematographer and producer. She imperilled herself and endured a difficult time in order to provide required medications to civilians in Fallujah; Rana witnessed the use of prohibited weapons by American forces without taking into consideration the lives of civilians. It is worthy to mention that high ranking generals have declared that they stroked parts of the town with napalm and broke the international protocols which entirely forbid the use of such weapons. On the one hand, Holmes created a play that concentrated on the sufferings of the people surrounded in Fallujah. On the other hand, he mocked democracy which was supposed to have been established in Iraq after 2003.

In the play, it has been reported that the calligraphy is created upon the interpretations of militaries, medical staff, and relief workers as well as civilians who escaped from the horrible situation in the town. Sasha, a TV correspondent, showed the difficulty of her task due to imposed restrictions by American troops who were annoying her to convey tragedy facts about the humanitarian situation inside the town (<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/apr/04/iraq.iraq>):

SASHA (*to camera*): Since the first assault on the city last year, Fallujah has been at the sensitive heart of the US presence in Iraq. Violent and determined opposition to the occupation has been at its most intense in the city, and for six months coalition forces have been placed in an increasingly difficult position in the face of such committed resistance. The discovery of the burned, brutalised and mutilated bodies of four American civilian contractors, working for Blackwater Security, can only intensify the already volatile situation.

(Holmes, p. 7) (Holmes, 2018)

It is a sign that the American invasion brought destruction instead of democracy. However, in the lens of the Americans, the results are not as significant as the purpose, as reported by the US General to the assembled journalists:



US GENERAL: We have problems, there's no hiding that. But basically Iraq is on track to realise the kind of Iraq that Americans want – and that Iraqis want - and, which is a democratic Iraq.

(Holmes, p. 7)

In addition to Sasha, Rana — an Iraqi aid worker — serves as a second witness of the failure of democracy in Iraq after 2003, in this play. Rana conveys the Fallujans' views, that their resistance springs from the idea that they do not trust the Americans:

RANA: People said, 'we were thinking the Americans came to help'. I was thinking 'they come to destroy Iraq'.

(Holmes, p. 8)

Ahrar, another Iraqi aid worker, agrees with Rana by mocking democracy in Iraq at the hands of America:

AHRAR: Under the Americans the doors are just kicked in. And now what? Go and vote and risk being blown to pieces or followed by insurgents and murdered for cooperating with the Americans? For what? To practice democracy? Are you joking?

(Holmes, p. 8)

Another sign of the destruction brought to Iraq under the name of democracy is the religious conflicts between the two large religious sects in Iraq, Sunna and Shia, which is reflected in this play at the tongue of an Iraqi Chritain cleric:

CLERIC: Fallujah is Sunni, like the Ba'athists, like Saddam. So they're mistrusted by the Shia and by the Yanks not because they're Muslim but because they're Sunni.

(Holmes, p. 11)

The Cleric is a mouthpiece of Holmes who believed that “[t]he city had been almost destroyed and a difficult situation brought to the brink of civil war” (Holmes, 2007).

The tribulation inflicted on Fallujah leads its people to be evil and murderers as a negative reaction. One of those brutal acts is kidnapping. A Fallujahian kidnaps Jo, a British clown, and Ahrar. When Jo asks him about the reason, he replies that it is America that drives them to act violently:



JO: Why us? Why take us?

MAN: My brother was killed and my brother's son and my sister's son. My other brother is in the prison at Abu Ghraib. I am the last one left. Can you imagine? And this morning my best friend was killed. He was wounded in the leg and lying in the street and the Americans came and cut his throat. Now, tell me, why us? Is it another crusade? First, they wanted Saddam. Was my brother Saddam? Now they say they search for Zarqawi. Are the children they shoot Zarqawi? Are the people they napalm Zarqawi? This is our Hiroshima.

(Holmes, p. 22-23)

However, America insists that all American resolutions and acts, including the military ones, are for disseminating democracy in Iraq and other countries in order to increase the number of democratic states in the world. This judgment is viewed by Rice in a speech in Stanford:

RICE: America and our friends and our allies must move decisively to take advantage of these new opportunities. This is, then, a period akin to 1945 to 1947, when American leadership expanded the number of free and democratic states to create a new balance of power that favoured freedom.

(Holmes, p. 26)

Further, she emphasises that the purpose of America is not occupation or colonisation, so far as spreading freedom and democracy:

RICE: America cannot impose its vision on the world — yet, we will use our influence to favor freedom. There are right and wrong choices and right and wrong acts.

(Holmes, p. 27)

It is a clear confession that America does not care for the results or what will happen next to the countries after invasion; simply, because it is the responsibility of their respective governments. Hence, in the case of what is happening to Fallujah, it is because of the Iraqi government's wrong acts and not America's, in Rice's opinion. Simultaneously, she forgets to comment that the American invasion in 2003 brought a paralysed government that was unable to rule a country with diverse races like Iraq. This fact is reflected in this play by Rana:

RANA: The Americans bring Shia police to Fallujah, which is another way to create a civil war. And that's it. They did it for a purpose, to bring Shia militia to Fallujah, which is typically Sunni.



(Holmes, p. 37)

In addition, Holmes also depicts the sufferings of Iraqis at the hands of Iraqis themselves. When Jo and Rana take Iraqi patients in the ambulance to the hospital in Fallujah, they are stopped by mujahideen who call Jo and Rana “traitors”:

RANA: So we get the ambulance through the checkpoint and suddenly we are surrounded by Iraqis, guns pointing, ready to shoot, shouting ‘you are traitors, you are taking American wounded to the hospital’! I mean, in a shot-up van! And the wounded say ‘Hey! We are Fallujans, which Americans are you talking about?’

The Americans evacuate the wounded by helicopter, not in vans like these! What are you talking about?’ So we got through.

(Holmes, p. 41)

This indicates that the Iraqis are no longer able to distinguish between their colleagues and enemies. They are shattered and their character is mentally unstable. They become aggressive.

As for the state of hospital and the medical care in Fallujah, it cannot be described due to negligence:

JO: (showing SASHA around) It’s not a hospital at all but a clinic, a private doctor’s surgery treating people for free since air strikes destroyed the town’s main hospital. Another has been improvised in a car garage. There’s no anaesthetic. The blood bags are in a drinks fridge and the doctors warm them up under the hot tap in the toilet.

(Holmes, p. 36)

In a press conference, Sasha reports her final report about freedom and democracy in Iraq through footage displaying Fallujah before and after 2003. She points out that what has happened, and what is still happening in Fallujah, can be applied to all other Iraqi provinces:

SASHA (*reporting to camera. The screens show a montage of documentary footage – Fallujah as it was prior to the invasion, and how it was in 2005.*): As of June 2005 Fallujans say that approximately 100,000 people are still refugees, unable to return to their homes, many of which no longer exist. Most people in the city continue to live in tents, or amid the rubble of their homes. Fallujah has become Iraq, and Iraq now is Fallujah. (Holmes, p. 45)



The statement of "Fallujah now is Iraq, and Iraq is Fallujah" has become a slogan repeated by many Iraqis (Holmes, 2007).

Eventually, Holmes affirms that America does not care about Iraq's affairs and considerations when Major Jassim Mohammad Saleh was appointed as a new commander, though he was a Ba'athist:

SASHA: General, is it true that this man was a Ba'athist? A senior commander under Saddam Hussein?

GENERAL: Now then, we don't know yet if he was a level two Ba'ath Party member. We really know very little about these guys yet: we've yet to talk to them all. They introduced themselves to the Marine commanders in Fallujah last week and said they had influence in the area that might prove useful.

(Holmes, p. 46)

Sasha demonstrates the uselessness of the war against Saddam Hussein since his men are still in the government:

SASHA: So there's a very real chance that you've gone to war to depose Saddam, and after killing tens of thousands of civilians you're restoring most of the original elite to power??

GENERAL: Sasha, do not exaggerate.

(Holmes, p. 46)

At the end of the play, Holmes concludes two facts: first, the notion of democracy is a trick played by America to extend its hegemony through destruction, retardation and illiteracy as in the case of Fallujah:

AHRAR: You know, it is only getting worse here. Everyday is worse than the last day. Today will be better than tomorrow. Right now is better than the next hour. This is our life here now.

(Holmes, p. 43)

This fact is stressed by Jenna Corderoy and Robert Perkins: "the operations carried out in Fallujah by American troops in 2004 resulted in significant civilian casualties and civilian infrastructure damage" (Corderoy & Robert, 2014).



Second, America's blind eye to its guilt by putting the blame on terrorists, on the one hand, and its pride of its achievement in increasing the number of democratic countries, on the other hand:

RICE: Today, . . . , I thank the good Lord for protecting those of our troops overseas, and our coalition troops and innocent Iraqis who suffer at the hands of some of these senseless killings by people who are trying to shake our will. Anyway, that's all I feel I should say here. . . . God bless you all, and God bless America.

End.

(Holmes, p. 48)

Based on the information mentioned above, the practices of American troops have confirmed the negative conceptions that Arabic communities previously believed. Therefore, the gap between the US and the people in countries such as Iraq, has increased dramatically. It is normally the case that these communities have lost a confidence in American theories which talk about democracy and civilians' rights to shape their political regime. The political project started with the use of forbidden weapons, such as napalm, which will not be welcomed in destroyed environments such as Fallujah.

The study conducted an online survey to investigate viewers who watched the play at that time (in 2007) to achieve a fairness in terms of Holmes's dissertation, which generally opposes American policy in the play and the American dissertation which supports a democratic model in Iraq, as the US administration claimed. The number of participants in the survey was 30 people, aged between 30 and 50 years, that have resided in London and watched the play. All of them were Iraqis.

The survey included three questions described as below:

1. To what extent did the play have on influencing your attitude towards American democratic theory?
2. In the 12 years since you have watched the play (2007–2019), how do you assess the new Iraqi political model?
3. Are you ready to resume your life in Iraq in the long term with a sustainable political democratic atmosphere?

The obtained results of the first question have illustrated the significant role of the play in switching peoples' attitude towards American democratic theory. Thirteen participants (approximately 44 per cent of them) confirmed that they changed their opinions on the involved democratic model supported by the United States.



In terms of the second question, the participants were very optimistic about the future of Iraq. Twenty-one of them (70 per cent) were strongly convinced that Iraq will overcome all its challenges in spite of the difficulties and occupy its outstanding position among its neighbours. These results entirely support what has verified in section six of the proposed work, that Iraq has a minimum essential background to hold a democratic model. Finally, the results of the third question demonstrated a noticeable passion of Iraqis, who have spent long years overseas, to one day return to their homeland; 18 respondents (60 per cent) confirmed this.

Conclusion

The study illustrated that Iraqis strongly want a democratic model that cares for all citizens and fights all autocratic shapes which are responsible for the disastrous conditions in Iraq. At the same time, they do not perceive the American intervention as a saver from the previous dictatorial regime, and what has happened in Fallujah is considered a disappointed experience, deepening the gap between the Iraqi community and American values. Finally, theatre is a basic player to shape public opinion and that was obvious from the first question.



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