

Consensual Democracy: A Challenge for Differentiated Citizenship

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This research aims to explore the consensual democracy model which has many weaknesses in practicing democracy, including diversity of ethnicity, groups, social and economic status, race, culture and so on. These become a challenge for consensual democracy. Nowadays, the multi-extreme-identity and the oppression from dominant groups creates a gap in the daily-life of citizens. Using qualitative methods and a phenomenological approach, this research aims to describe and perceive the majorities and minorities gaps as citizens in consensual democracy. The phenomenon of domination and gap in power relations as citizens try to elaborate using an inclusion-differentiated model of policy is discussed. This research also perceives how the ideology and power relation has a deep impact to the public discourse, moreover the majority rules as a policy to distribute the power for the different citizens just made citizens excluded from their public sphere. The findings from this research are domination and oppression caused by this gap must be approached by recognition. The ability to recognise must be expanded in public discourse through policy and power distribution, which is offered in this research, including how the government approaches to perceive the multi-extreme-identity not only put all the policy in majority but also make a different policy for different citizens to distribute equally.

Key words: *Consensual, difference, inclusive, recognition, democracy.*

Introduction

Consensual democracy offers inclusiveness for freedom and liberty. However, at the same time democracy basically does not agree with violence, it means our freedom is bordered with responsibility to others, especially those that lead to force as a way out in making political decisions (Munck, 2015). This majority domination leads us to a tradition where the problem of pluralism is solved only by force policy, because we generally understand

democracy as a combination of ideas about the power of people and ideas about individual rights which is guaranteed by law. As we know, the result of liberal discourses are that people can be understood as aggregative of individuals, so the rights and policy is being perceived by the majority (Danujaya, 2012). Social contracts are set as a standard for people to understand the basis of equality, but there are things that make the social contract have a different meaning. It is caused by some groups in the majority who dominate which do oppression and domination of the other groups' minorities (Hikmawan, 2017a). Majority assume that minorities are not part of them or the others among them. It was caused from many things, such as they are becoming minor because identity, race, culture, even groups make them become marginal from the others. At that point democracy became a paradox because it produced inequality for citizens (Hikmawan, 2017a).

It should be a way for the consensual democracy model to be a system of the state to distribute power and present to the equality (Fishkin, 2011), freedom and justice for citizens to access everything in the public sphere. However, today in the consensual democracy model, it has become paradoxical to understand democracy who generate the domination to other people just because they are *different* with the dominant people or the majority.

The essence we are discussing from equality and democracy is how the justice can be achieved by citizens; especially for minorities (Mouffe, 2011). The definition of justice in consensual democracy is when every citizen has the same opportunities in the public sphere and that's all happened because they have rationality to make decisions about what we will do and these become the characteristics of being human (Hikmawan & Hidayat, 2016). However, on the other side this paradigm ignore the reality of life we have that there are pluralism and complexity and it cannot be simply to generalise the rationality of the public sphere (Mouffe, 2000). The uniqueness from being human are when we always face the unique situations, either because of physical condition, social, cultural, or civilization which made us different to each other. The others as unique people or groups cannot be excluded, because as citizens we influence each other. The social relation was built by each group because they constituted each other and this process makes them unique (Young, 1990). So, in this situation we must distribute justice in another way, we cannot make those as general for all. The differences of citizens must be understood as their uniqueness, all those make power, justice, equality and policy must distribute in different way (Hikmawan, 2017a).

Every social group actually has important roles to constitute each member. These groups are part of citizens in a state system and they already have social relations to influence each other. Their differences and uniqueness is embedded and cannot be excluded from social life (Mouffe, 1993). Chantal Mouffe especially has views that social groups never exist by themselves, but their existence is always related to the others existence and constitutes each other being a necessity (Mouffe, 1993).

Conceptual Framework

Consensual democracy puts itself in a rationality argument as a basis of political decision in the public sphere. Heterogeneity and multiplicity of every group becomes a social factor that means consensual democracy has limitations to explain freedom and equality in a democracy. Freedom and equality are fundamental elements of a democracy. John Rawls interprets democracy as justice and fairness. Justice in a democracy is an understanding of the differences and puts rationality as an ultimate instrument to achieve the consensual democracy (Rawls, 2001). Rawls views on democracy as a social justice community in fairness through socio-community cooperation.

At least Rawls uses the two terms of understanding of the basic ideas of liberty and equality as fairness in consensual democracy. The first is the idea of citizen, in this case the individual is free and equal. The second is the idea of a well-ordered society. This idea is about social order, namely that society is effectively regulated by a public conception of justice (Rawls, 2001). The most fundamental idea in this conception of justice is the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation over time from one generation to the next. We use this idea as the central organizing idea in trying to develop a political conception of justice for a democratic regime.

Furthermore, Rawls distinguishes the reasonability and rationality, for Rawls rationality can produce some appropriate policies, but in certain circumstances not reasonable for socio-community system social cooperation (Rawls, 2001). Therefore, he distinguishes justice as fairness where the common sense of the majority to be very major in producing public policy. All the consensual framework was built, the main thing is to put a homogeneous public reason and rationality to achieve deliberative democracy. The homogeneous of citizens means democracy can be accepted as aggregative issues where democracy can reduce the dominant decision (Behrent, 2015). The inadequacy of this deliberative model is currently faced by the heterogeneity of citizen assumptions on pluralism.

Table 1: Scheme of Politics of Differences

Preposition	Deliberative model "Consensual"	Model differentiated citizenship
Utopia Baseline	Utopia would be existence because of universalisation of social reality through rationality. It's manifested in the processes of deliberation which is endless for searching the consensus of every rational group.	Facticity in social facts. Presenting cultural partiality that makes a difference to each other and presents in everyday social life. Utopia that appears next to minimise

		disagreements that have the potential of wildness and violence.
Anthropological Assumption	<p>Assuming Homogeneity (Rational Individual)</p> <p>The sovereignty of the individual or citizen on the fullness of himself, in the sense of that the individual is considered a very rational and responsible for themselves as a social agent capable of providing rational decisions anyway. Full in an independent selfhood means being an individual who is full-rational. (Immanuel Kant). In this condition they are in the original position "original position" Social Contract (John Rawls)</p>	<p>Heterogeneity Assumption Anthropological Autonomy as radical Individuals:</p> <p>The sovereignty of every group or citizen is the result of culture, with the result that they become unique with each other because they are present in reciprocity. therefore they are "unique". The circumstances of differences of each other. In this sense of that, they exist on the partiality and full-respectively. Their presence as the others just another "constituted". Diversity of them never fix and always contingent</p>
Social Relationships Between Individuals and Groups Social	<p>Monolog deliberative:</p> <p>Assuming "original position" as a rational cause a prerequisite in the provision of consensus. Exclusion becomes a logical consequence of mono-discourse in rationality consensus. Issuing all-everything non-rational is the main thing in establishing consensus between individuals or groups. (Habermas)</p>	<p>Dialog-radicalism among differences:</p> <p>The difference and uniqueness of every group into a collective consciousness. Decision or outcome is no longer the main goal, but the process will tolerate diversity awareness that makes it remained at the same level in every individual or group. (Mouffe)</p>
Together Life goal (Co-Existentia)	<p>Co-existentia: consensual model</p> <p>In praxis, co-existentia is a sustainable model of consensual deliberation (continuity) in maximising mono-discourse</p>	<p>Co-existentia: differential model</p> <p>In praxis. Co-existentia is a continuous agony in disagreement, minimising</p>

	agreement (those who agreed to broaden and deepen the agreement)	conflict that could not agree in the ideals of democratic pluralism. (Laclau, Mouffe)
Political Mechanism	Consensual: endless deliberation process in order to solidify the deal (contingency deliberative)	Hegemony of the power relations of meaning to the differences, differences is idealism itself.
Politics mode	“Eudaemonia” (Social Contract “eudaemonia”)	“Eudaemonia” in diversity: Recognition is the key on equivalences

Literature Review

The placement of a group on the stereotypes used to justify subordination can also be revised. Stating that the position is determined based on relationships, interactions, and comparison also emphasised the multiplicity of social groups as well as the subject (Hikmawan, 2017b). Through a different view, perception and reaction to a social group will also vary. Liquidity of individual identity is also increasingly evident due to the fact that someone can be in more than one social group.

"The view that the group differences in the plural, cross, liquid, and can turn implies another criticism against the model of self-autonomy, the whole. In a complex society, a society with such a high diversity of our society, everyone has the identification plural group (Young, 1990).

The opportunity to redefine the position and meaning of the social groups will always be open because of the state of contingency foundation. However, although this study starts from the problem of the diversity of social identity in the community, the main problems lies in the whole political dimension. The experience of injustice is rooted in cultural imperialism, but that does not mean the state is a cultural problem (Hikmawan, 2017a).

The following section will use the framework (Appiah, 2005) of Appiah's view of inequality issues towards social group appointed by (Young, 1990) as whole political problems. Social identity according to Appiah consists first of all constituted of labels and social conceptions that are known by the public. The availability of those terms in public discourse requires a common understanding of the majority of members of the public that there are such labels at once a kind of consensus of how to identify these labels to be applied at the relevant. The labels are made as they are categorised in a collective identity recognised as different from the various aspects of the public (Appiah, Benhabib, Young, & Fraser, 2007).

In addition, the collective identity cannot be considered to exist if there is nothing to identify themselves in that label. The second element of the social identity of the internalisation of the label as part of the individual identity at least for some of which carry the label (Appiah, 2005). Accepting yourself as part of a collective identity means constituting the few things of themselves according to the way that identity is formed; so different from the other. The last thing that constitutes social identity according to Appiah is how to behave properly to carry the label.

Though stereotypes are used as the basis, how social groups should apply themselves to a collective identity is something that is only a rough conception and does not have clear boundaries. No limitation of a collective identity are factors that make it easier to use as a weapon unilateral view of self-affirmation (De Greiff, 2000). The underlying logic is cultural imperialism, that is, when a social group compares themselves to affirm the universality of application of its norms so that makes inferior other social identities in public. Unfortunately, the dominance group assumes that the inferior identity is due to the social conditions cannot resist. As a result, they inevitably incur the label along with the treatment that is considered the dominant group as it is proper for those who were inferior. This situation is clearly a political issue because it comes from the fact that describes the treatment by others, and how the treatment of the other party will lead the successes and failures in one's life (Appiah, 2005).

Method

This research uses qualitative methods with a phenomenological approach. As qualitative research, this research tries to make a deeper sense of the meaning that some people consider coming from social and humanitarian problems (Creswell, 2013). Why the researcher is using phenomenology approach in this research, is because this research tries to elaborate on the phenomenon about discrimination in Indonesia and to perceive that we need intention to know deeper either the condition or complexity in power relations of munity-extreme-culture in Indonesia. In order to obtain valid and accurate data, this research will also be as open as much as possible to various possibilities. The important things are the literatures from previous paradigms or ideologies about inclusion and democracy. The Phenomenology Approach will be used as an approach to be able to better understand how the possibility of understanding all the cases involved in the issues examined in this study are revealed and reveals itself so that the understanding obtained becomes comprehensive.

Results and Discussion

Re-Thinking Freedom in Diversity

Accepting the diversity of identities as part of the social life of is the ideal of the demand for recognition. The situation when individuals respect each other in the awareness of the uniqueness of the characteristics and experiences of fellow social groups with diverse backgrounds becomes a dialectics of democracy and it also becomes the process of political differences (Hikmawan, 2017b). Such conditions enable each individual to be free to pursue their life goals without being limited by the others' social identity or dominant group but not to break up from this uniqueness (Anthony Dawahare, 2002). Freedom for self-determination and self-improvement is a condition that Iris Marion Young struggles for as social justice. But freedom is often interpreted only as selfness freedom and others freedom. The state of mutual respect for each other's freedom is interpreted as a state without mutual intervention.

People with the freedom to determine the direction of their lives do not have the right to do what others do as a form of respect for the others, this concept implies that each person with the freedom to determine the direction of their life does not have bonds attached to respecting outsiders (Habermas Jürgen, 1998). Yet in social life humans do not only interact with other humans but also connected to one another. Through interactions in the world of economy, history, social, cultural or the consequences of unexpected actions, human social life is developed as a complex network (Habermas Jürgen., 1998).

Citizens cannot deny that their lives are interdependent and influence each other with other citizens (Jenssen, 2008). Because they live together, they are all influenced by and related to the same environment as citizens and also, by the structural consequences of the fact that they are all interconnected (Habermas J., 1996). Awareness of interconnectedness in the world makes citizens unable to be selfish just for the sake of maximum benefit of their side. Exposure to the state of interconnection is a trigger for citizens to realize that in their actions, especially in the form of interference to the other and there is a great responsibility. As long as the others are affected by the activities of people with freedom to determine the direction of their lives, the others have the legal right to have their interests and needs taken into account even if they are outside the jurisdiction of the government concerned (Habermas J., 1996).

Therefore, Young redefined freedom not as a state without interference, but a state of absence of the relation of domination. Domination is contained in a position in a series of relations that allows agents to arbitrarily intervene in the actions of other parties (Habermas J., 1996). Not all interference will be detrimental and not all circumstances that allow the others to intervene means a threat to sovereignty (Jenssen, 2008). Some interventions aim

for broader sovereignty in determining the living conditions of social groups and individuals. For example, women have the right to intervene in the determination of employment policies regarding regulations during pregnancy and lactation because they are the only onesthose who know the experience. Submission of a representative of women who hasve worked during their pregnancy is needed so that the decisions made are in the best interests of the mother and baby. In fact, without representative intervention from the point of view of women, the labour force actually has a position to dominate women and exploit them for business profit alone.

Relationship of dominance clearly puts a person in the position of guilty. The whole point of making a mistake or showing blame is for one purpose which is to state that the person or those people (Young, 2011), based on the virtues of what they have done, bears direct moral and legal responsibility for an error or crime, while others do not bear it because their actions are not done intentionally to break the rules (Young, 2011). The practice of blaming can only be done if there is evidence that can show directly the involvement of the others in the inequality situation.

According to Young, the groups or communities who are responsible for the relation of domination is not only the groups who directly carries out the abuse, but also the groups who knows the implementation of the abuse and allows it to continue. If the groups carrying out the relation of domination is legally and morally responsible, the collective society that silences such despotism, according to Young, adopts Arendt's thought that are politically responsible. In interpreting individual freedom, we cannot examine individuals apart from social as in the view of liberalism, and freedom must also be examined in the grand scheme of social-structural processes. In a life together, people inevitably have to be responsible for the lives of other humans being because according to Arendt as quoted by Young:

“(1) I am responsible for what I did not do and, (2) the reason for my responsibility is my membership of a group that I cannot voluntarily dismiss (Young, 2011).

In Arendt's understanding, a person cannot help but be responsible for the lives of others because he is part of a political community that engages in the relation of domination. However, Young further sees that those who are said to have political responsibility are those who inhabit the social system that allows crime and support the system at least with passive support.

In this case, passivity produces a political vacuum (Young, 2011). The status quo makes injustice last forever. For example, during the period of apartheid politics in South Africa, many white people treated black people well as their workers but politically they did not try to elevate their position to be equal with them. As a result, apartheid's politics had to last

from 1948 to 1994 before ending. In a social structure, political participation is something that has significant power not only for one's own interests but also for the interests of the other. Only by actively participating in political activities social structures that support the freedom of individuals can be achieved. Therefore, the freedom of citizens to participate in political activities cannot be separated from the responsibility to the others freedom.

Why Re-Distribution and Recognition are Needed

Self-reward is very closely related to human dignity because only through recognition of the authenticity of self-identity as human dignity can be respected according to the circumstances. Without recognition of the authenticity of self-identity, citizens only become a part of society without special value to give special attention other than the condition that they live (Weale, 2016). The situation according to (Taylor, 2000) is very contrary to the concept of self-reward. Recognition is not just a form of being polite to other people. Recognition is a vital human need (Young, 2011). In societies that generalize identities, social hierarchy is the basis of a unique self-identity to be recognized and valued as a uniqueness.

Because only a few people can reach the top of the social pyramid, self-reward is exclusive. Identity is understood as the basis of honour, honour which intrinsically becomes a sign of inequality in society because it can only be owned by a limited group (Young, 2011). Situations that glorify equality actually manipulate human selfishness to the point of hurting the idea of equality itself. Therefore, Charles Taylor brought a new concept of recognition and identity. Recognition no longer relies on social hierarchy, but on human dignity which according to Taylor is the true core of the idea of equality. The politics of universalism is really present with the shifting focus of recognition from respect to dignity, namely the emphasis on equality of dignity for all citizens and the content of that politics is by the realization of equality of rights (Young, 2011).

Recognition of the universal in Taylor's conception is with a distinctive recognition. The specificity referred to in this case is the personal characteristics of individuals, but this also has logical implications for cultural distinctiveness. The uniqueness of a particular cultural group is the basis of one's self (Young, 2000), although not as a whole. Without adequate recognition of cultural groups, a person cannot obtain recognition from society and the state in accordance with the significance of the values carried through the group in which he or she belongs. Therefore, Young sees that Taylor offers the concept of recognition as an end goal sought by social groups from interaction with others in order to create conditions of mutual respect (Young, 2000).

Those social recognition will secure the political position of groups which are under the auspices of identity and multiculturalism political movements. Social recognition should not be enough if it is considered a condition of justice. making political communication clearly requires an awareness of intersubjectivity through a process of recognition. However, this is not the final solution to social problems because the recognition process will never be fully realized. However, egalitarian conditions must be constructed in every situation such as, policy, social life, cultural and etc. (Contucci, Panizzi, Ricci-Tersenghi, & Sîrbu, 2016). Recognition is more appropriately understood as an effort to build the basic social conditions needed to achieve political equality in social conditions full of cultural imperialism. Nancy Fraser opposes the idea that the concept of recognition is sufficient to answer the challenges of this age. My general thesis is that justice today requires redistribution and recognition (Fraser & Honneth, 2003).

The demand for recognition by identity politics ignore that injustice does not only occur in the issue of social acceptance but also in the field of economic politics (Mouffe, 1999). Young also emphasized this point clearly in his conception of domination and oppression. But Fraser is different from Young by looking at economic issues and recognition needs separately

“the two forms of injustice in the form are not an indirect effect of the other forms of injustice, both are the main problem and co-original ” (Fraser & Honneth, 2003).”

It is undeniable that socio-cultural and economic conditions are very influential on opportunities for social involvement. If (Taylor, 2000) only sees recognition as a condition for citizens to respect one another in their socio-cultural circumstances, Fraser goes further for the recognition is a matter of justice. To see recognition as a matter of justice is to treat it as an issue of social status. This means examining the institutional pattern of cultural values and their influence on the position of social actors (Mouffe, 1999). If and when the pattern constitutes social actors as peers among other social actors, making it able to participate in the same level with each other in social life, then we can say these conditions as mutual recognition and equality of status (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). Likewise, with the state of the economy.

“Class is an objective subordinate order derived from an economic arrangement that rejects some social actors based on the [standard] assets and resources they need for equality of participation (Fraser & Honneth, 2003).

In Through a wider perspective, it can be said that social justice in Fraser's conception is a condition of inclusiveness in democracy and does not concern self-realization. Explanation of the relationship between recognition and self-realization or recognition as a condition of

social inclusiveness is to realize justice is a common view (Young, 2011). Recognition of the needs of a social group can create equitable social conditions in the sense that they are not just equal but as needed (Mouffe, 1999). On the other hand, recognition is a personal matter in the effort of self-realization. Young's views in the following discussion differ from general views because he explained the link between social justice and self-realization.

Is it Possible for Diversity?

Today in the era of the nation-state, the intensity of the diversity of the differences increased rapidly because of the tendency across groups, ethnic, racial, religious and socio-cultural change increased extensively so that the old boundaries of a nation. As shown Benedict Anderson (Anderson, 1991), limits a nation undergoing expansion and enrichment definitive, so that it no longer presumes a certain ethnic or racial boundary such as the length of it covers 'all' including communities that are within a certain sovereign territory (Mouffe, 1999). Even in underdeveloped countries where ethnic cleansing based war as in a handful of African countries has been difficult to find a model though orthodox country with ethnic sovereignty of the tribal-based staple (Anthony Dawahare, 2002), especially with singleness as a state religion in the era of ethno-religious nationalism in centuries past.

So, limiting a developing nation extends, covers all individuals from various groups, ethnic and racial legally became citizens in units of sovereign territory. (Anderson, 1991) called it "an imagined political community" in certain territorial sovereignty. So, for him, the nation rather "an imagined political community and are inherently conceivable either limited or sovereign (Anderson, 1991).

His reasoning is that community 'imagined' because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of reviews of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of reviews of their communion. "Furthermore, the nation" imagined as limited (imagined as 'limited') because even the reviews largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond that which lies other nations. "Then again, the nation" imagined as sovereign (imagined as a 'sovereign') because the concept was born in an age in the which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical Dynastic realm. "And, Last, the nation "imagined as a community (imagined as a 'community'), because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship (Anderson, 1991)."



The current situation with the extreme diversity of the group which is different from the others even a group of different social groups can naturally brings us to the paradox and that must be faced by our democracy today (Mouffe, 2000). Freedom of choice and the recovery of human ethical responsibility simultaneously accompanied by the elimination of comfort for providing universal direction uniform as like had promised by religion, ideological or other modern era of comprehensive doctrine (Bauman, 2003). By doing so, citizens must establish a framework of ethics themselves and to each his own 'private'. That's why people are no longer able to live take of the big narratives or mono-discourse like the homogeneous citizen. In fact, the framework of ethics should be built without a foundation and a selfness that is also without foundation of meta-narratives, which has been responsible for such a foundational guarantee (Gibson, 2001).⁹

Therefore, for Zygmunt Bauman, full acceptance over the constitutive differences and the consequences on their diversity is precisely the principal characteristic of this era. Clearly diversity is not the temporality that can be overcome, but the quality was excluded because it is constitutive of existence (Bauman, 1993). As a result of the rise of diversity, diversity should be understood as the basic structure of society and can't be eliminated. For Bauman, denying the false hope of the universality, equality, domination and certainty of the majority, become a first step towards emancipation. Citizens in this era were destined not to "overcome" but to live in peace with "differences" and diversity, so, they accept the situation along with the resulting ambivalence belonging to the realm of ethics and politics (Bauman, 1993).

As stated in the exposure Bauman reported as follows: The ethical paradox of the postmodern condition is that it restores to agents the fullness of moral choice and responsibility while simultaneously depriving them of the comfort of the modern universal guidance of self-confidence that once promised. Ethical tasks of individuals grow while the socially produced resources to fulfil them shrink. Moral responsibility comes together with the loneliness of moral choice.

Meanwhile, on the other hand, The development of this global political praxis puts consensual liberal democracy as the holder of the global ideological agenda, but the victory proved to be accompanied by the success of tackling inequality-political order of the world economy; such as the promise of ideologies. This inability was evident through the failure of the global economic-political regime in narrowing the gap socio-economic of each country and part in shrinking unemployment and absolute poverty in the world (Unger, 1998).

Monolog-discourse of consensual democracy illustrates the rift because of the demands of openness in the public sphere and diversity era. But the demand for difference and diversity are having trouble manifesting because politics is just presenting a single/mono discourse

without expending the public discourse for differentiated citizens, so that it leads to political closure. This is the paradox that political praxis should also be facing democratic politics in this era, where the dominance of mono-discourses exclude participation in democratisation, there is only similarity and closure of political demands. Given the diversity and openness of the democratic demands today, thus, all of this confronts democratic politics on two paradoxes that must simultaneously solve. Political ethics paradox confronts the theoretical challenge to overcome socio-political, while political praxis paradox confronts the challenges of single dominance to overcome the tendency of global political order is being shackled in a situation mono-discourse.

Conclusion

Differentiated Citizenship for Democracy

Social change for recognition only happen if the public discourse is expanded (Young, 1990). All the experience about domination and oppression must remember as a noodle point to change, to achieve all the citizens must be active as a part of policy making. In the 18th century Montesquieu put forward the idea of separation of powers into three categories, it is called the executive, legislative, and judicial categories of government so that no party, group or anyone holds absolute power. In a democracy, the role of the main branches of state power needs to be made explicit i.e. the people. The popular movements into the control and oversight of government in a broader spectrum than just the daily activities of the country have been run properly according to the rules. The existence of the judiciary only to consider that the activities of the executive have been as determined by the legislature and not by the people. The policy of the diversity group must be made different according to their needs and specialties (Hikmawan, 2017b).

Only the aspirations of the people themselves were adequate to oversee that state run according to the needs of the people. In addition to the weaknesses in the methodology of observation and analysis of the government to the needs of the people, there will always be the threat of misuse of power. The separation of powers does not rule out the possibility that it can be done colluding between individual holders of the three powers. Abuse of power to be systematic and justified can be made legally. Vigilance of the people against the government's actions is one way to make the country and sets of rules still oriented to the people. In a society with a free public sphere that examines the holder and institutions of power, it will be difficult for them to act for the benefit of yourself by taking part with others. Accountability is based on a civil public sphere that can help make gestures rulers remain within the law and with honesty. The pressure on the government through civil society institutions in the public sphere is a reminder that in a democracy it is assumed that the state's power comes from the people (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).



The diversity of citizens is a marker for the institution and the people themselves will challenge the state of life that is not built on the basis of homogeneity. Communication between civil society activities in the public sphere is the underlying communicative society. The process of communication between social groups can change the way of thinking of a group against other groups stating that the victim of the practice of equality is distribution. Contestation of interest includes the data that other social groups have been marginalizsd. This new knowledge can change the content of public opinion and pressure on the urgency of the social situation that requires state policies. Deliberative democracy is not able to separate the roles of the people and the government. Synergies are both present in the communication work. Without civil society, decentralised communication in the public sphere will become an irregular network. Identification of the problems that exist in society proposed by civil society represent the government. Therefore, the system of democratic government must be transformed according to the diversity of its citizens and differentiated policy in democracy.



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