Post-Social Conflict: The Role of Indonesian Armed Forces on Ambon Island

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Social conflict on Ambon Island is one of the worst social conflicts in Indonesian post-independence history. Triggered by individual conflicts, the escalation of the conflict then expands to become communities and inter-faith conflict; furthermore, the conflict then unfortunately involved non-Ambonese people and even armed security forces. This paper aim is to find out the role of the Indonesia Armed Forces – Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat (TNI-AD) - post-social conflict on Ambon Island, as an effort to construct communication during the conflict and to prevent the recurrence of the conflict.

Key words: *Social conflict, Ambon, TNI AD, communication.*

Introduction

As an archipelago country, consisting of more than 17,000 islands, Indonesia has challenges in maintaining the sovereignty of its territory from various threats. The threats can be either military and non-military threats. Ambon Island in Maluku Province is one of Indonesia's regions, which has a high potential threat, related to non-military threats.

The emergence of non-military threats became a matter which was then taken seriously by the government, especially in terms of the fading aspect of national unity, due to 1999 and 2003 were very serious horizontal conflict between Muslims and Christians in Ambon Island (Hakimah, 2015; Lindawaty, 2011). Conflicts that occur between religious communities in Ambon, generally fall into the category of threats to domestic security which initially were not triggered by religious factors, but were caused by other factors such as economic, social and political factors (Hakimah, 2015; Marpaung, 2011). As the opinion among Christians

shows that indigenous, Muslims and migrants have an economic level that is considered relatively better because of their work as traders and with these other groups having more roles in government (Hakimah, 2015).

In order to overcome horizontal conflict in Ambon Island, Maluku Province, after the events of 1999-2003, a peaceful settlement carried out by Indonesian National Army (TNI), Indonesian National Police (Polri) and local government officials, involving religious and community leaders. The Malino I Agreement (2001) Malino II Agreement (2002) was in vain, due to the September 2011 riots; this conflict reoccurred because the potential for conflict is still quite large. Lindawaty (2011) concludes that there are major issues that have not completed after the signing of the Malino II Agreement; generate the chance of clashes and riots after the agreement is still large. Evidently, the death of a Muslim motorcycle taxi driver in a Christian area later became a major trigger in the 2011 riots.

One of the efforts made by the government, especially the Ministry of Defense, to reduce the risk of subsequent conflict in Ambon Island is by involving the TNI to strengthen national unity. The involvement of the TNI in the aftermath of the social conflict in Ambon was part of overcoming non-military security threats as well as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), which due to Article 9 of Law No. 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense.

TNI participation in the post-conflict activities could be seen from the perspective of political policies determined by the government and the House of Representative (HoR) through Law No. 3 of 2002. Article 4 states that national defence aims to safeguard and protect the sovereignty of the country, the territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and the safety of all nations from all forms of threats. The occurrence of conflicts with violence and the impact on the occurrence of division, as happened in Ambon, is a form of conflict that threatens the safety and integrity of the nation.

It is undeniable that the involvement of the TNI in dealing with the issue of social conflict is still debatable, due to the involvement of the TNI was considers to only make a repressive way in the handling of social conflict (Panghegar, 2014; Sutiono, 2018). However, despite concerns about the condition, the TNI remains committed to adhering to democratic laws and civil authority. This essay will discuss to what extent The Indonesia Armed Forces (TNI-AD) role in post-social conflict on Ambon Island.

Literature Review

Fisher, et al. (2001) revealed that conflict could be interpreted as social situations where there are two or more groups have different goals or differences in values. Moreover, depth conflict is a type of interaction characterised by clashes or collisions between interests, ideas,

wisdom, programs, and personal or other basic issues that are mutually contradictory (Mai & Thuy, 2015P; Plano, Riggs, & Robin, 1994). Just like Plano, et al. (1994), Rahim (2011) also assesses conflict is an interactive process that shows the existence of incompatibility, disputes, or dissonance within or between social entities (individuals, groups, organisations, etc.).

The occurrence of clashes between conflicting interest groups could be described as differences of opinion, competition and opposition between individuals and individuals, individuals with groups, groups with individuals or individuals, groups with the government (Surbakti, 2010). However, Boulding (1963) saw that conflict was part of the competition that could potentially arise when some parties realised that they could no longer be together, this was because of the position they both wanted to get.

The potential for conflict to be open (manifest conflict), according to Hoffer (1998) drives from the desired factor for change and the desire to get a replacement. This factor, at one time, was able to move a mass movement that moved instantly, demanding revolutionary change (Hoffer, 1998). With the existence of a mass movement that is instant and the demands of a revolutionary change, then they want to replace a particular position or situation, the conflict that arises then has a political nuance.

Political conflicts based on competition or opposition to fight for interests and make a revolutionary change can arise due to economic, social, political and cultural motives (Azhar, 2015; Hoffer, 1998; Parsad, 2017; Surbakti, 2010). Surbakti (2010) considers the existence of political conflicts caused by social and cultural motives, such as differences in ethnicity, religion, and race as a form of political conflict caused by horizontal pluralism. Whereas based on economic motives and power (politics) is a political conflict resulting from vertical pluralism. In the view of Lawang (1994) and Stoner and Wankel (1998) conflicts due to these motives occur because the four have relatively limited resources so that one group and another group fight over, members of different organisations or subunits try to win their respective interests.

According to Irving (1995), that in general social conflict contains a series of phenomena conflict between individuals, groups through from class conflicts to conflicts and international warfare. In a more in-depth view, according to Bystrova and Gottschalk (2015) conflict theory, social shows that professionals who are strong and rich represent the elite class and are powerful in society. This theory states that the dominant group used law enforcement to minimise threats to their interests. The justice system is biased and designed to protect the ruling class. Similarly, Petrocelli, Piquero and Smith (2003) and Siegel (2011) namely where the theory of social conflict shows that the strong and rich in the upper class of society define what is right and what is wrong.

When reflecting the view that understanding of social conflict could be understood based on the existence of views or thoughts (based on Marxist thinking) argue that individuals and groups (social classes) in society interact based on conflict rather than consensus. Through various forms of conflict, groups will tend to reach different material and non-material resources (such as the rich vs. the poor). More influential groups will tend to use their power to maintain power and exploit groups with smaller powers. If only based on social conflict in the form of domination of the dominant class, then the Ambon conflict did not consider as social conflict.

Although there is notion that conflict based on the view that indigenous Muslims and migrants have a better economic level due to their work as traders and more roles in government (Hakimah, 2015), events that are considered as social conflicts in Ambon have not found a form of "dominant group" mastery of other groups.

Looking at the characteristics of social conflict occurred in Ambon, some thoughts can more cover the phenomenon of social conflict in Ambon. Ahmadi (2007) generally characterises the factors that are at the root of social conflict, namely as follows:

1. Differences between community members, both physically and mentally, or differences in abilities, convictions, and feelings that lead to clashes or clashes between them. For example, a brawl between students is an example of the following social conflict;
2. Differences in cultural patterns, such as differences in customs, ethnicities, religions, languages, political understandings, life views, and other regional cultures, encourage the competition and opposition even clashes among members of the community. For example, the emergence of the Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (Islamic Army rebellion), Andi Aziz rebellion, PRRI/ PERMESTA (Indonesia regional rebellion in 1957), the Malari incident (1980), G30S / PKI (Indonesia Communist Party rebellion in 1965), and the like are proof of the conflict in Indonesian society due to primordial regional, tribal, racial, or differing political views.
3. Differences in social status, such as social inequalities between the rich and the poor, the older and the younger generation are the factors causing social conflict.
4. Differences interests between members of the community both personally and in groups, such as differences in policy, economic, socio-cultural, religious interests and the like are factors that cause social conflict.
5. Social change occurs, among others in the form of changes in the value system, due to the inclusion of a new value system that transforms traditional society into a modern society, also becomes a trigger factor for social conflict

Referring to the above factors; the second factor is congenial in the occurrence of social conflict in Ambon. This argument is based on Schulze's (2002) study, which considers that

the conflict in Ambon is more of a social conflict than a religious conflict, where conflict can be seen from the historical roots of religious communities in Ambon that have competed since more than 350 years before. The mapping is the competition between Christian and Muslim communities and between Protestants and Catholics in maintaining dominance.

Schulze (2002), although he rejected the assumption that the conflict in Ambon was a religious conflict and could be seen more as a social conflict, which meant there was a difference between the two conflicts. Greeley (1966) states that there is a close connection between social conflict and religion, especially when looking at the condition of society in the United States in the 1960s. The high religious principle is the motive of the protest movement and related to the role of the church in the protest movement in opposing injustice. Besides, Greeley (1966) also saw what called "religious group conflict in America" between Protestant, Catholic and Jewish groups. In other words, social conflicts can be encouraged by the existence of religious ties with the encouragement of religious institutions.

In the context of the connection between social conflicts caused by religious factors also analysed by Smith (1976). In the case of South Asia (India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka), Smith (1976) saw that there was a change in the situation in which traditions based on values and caste in religion clashed with elements of modernity which eventually led to conflict. Some groups that influenced by the element of modernity encourage that every citizen has the same right to obtain a better education and economic status, while some of them want to maintain religious elements in the socio-political aspects. In a further relationship, this condition also raises problems between Hindu and Muslim communities.

The involvement of the TNI to prevent social conflict from occurring, which is carried out during peacetime (non-war), then in the literature review section it is necessary to examine various concepts and theories about the military's role in peacetime. Harrison (1992) describes how the military role in the United States when an earthquake on April 18, 1906 which caused so much damage and also large fires; a very urgent condition allowed support troops (military) to take part in public duties, and this became a momentum for the military to play a role in planning, coordinating, and administering all assistance.

In carrying out their duties as peacekeepers, especially in areas that have suffered from conflict, the military is prohibited from using harsh means, because they have the responsibility to gradually reduce the occurrence of conflicts between groups within the country, and are responsible to build the basis of infrastructure for democracy. They (the military) in carrying out their role as peacekeepers in conflict areas have to monitor the occurrence of the cease-fire, control of disarmament, supervise the process of prisoner-of-war exchange and other forms of peacekeeping, such as repairing roads and bridges and stabilising the community (Takai, 2003).

Apart from its duties in carrying out the role of monitoring the ceasefire process, military forces in carrying out their roles as peacekeeping forces can collaborate to form communications, logistics, hospitals, facilities, and other units. As has been done in the UN mission in East Timor through the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), Somalia (UNITAF and UNOSOM), Bosnia (UNPROFOR) and Kosovo (UNMIK and KFOR) (Takai, 2003).

To analyse the role of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) after the social conflict in Ambon, especially in assisting the government in strengthening national unity, researchers used several indicators of the theory of military roles in peaceful circumstances which were put forward by two different experts namely Harrison (1992) and Takai (2003). There are two theoretical indicators taken from Harrison 's theory, when those concerned reveal that in carrying out their role in peacetime, specifically based on the case of the US military role when helping the public shortly after the earthquake, that the military participated in several roles, including planning), and coordinating. In this context, the research shows that the indicators of planning and coordination have similarities with the roles carried out by the TNI in the field.

Whereas from the five indicators of the theory proposed by Takai (2003) related to the role of the military as a peace force, namely forming communication, logistics, hospitals, facilities, and other units. The researcher then only uses communication and logistics indicators as an analysis tool. The selection of these indicators based on patterns of conformity in the field. So based on the explanation above, the analysis related to the role of the Indonesian National Army (TNI) after the social conflict in Ambon can be seen through the implementation of roles in: planning, coordination, communication, and logistics.

Research Method

This research design uses qualitative methods. The use of qualitative methods is considered more appropriate because this research wants to look and look more deeply at the political phenomena that emerge. This data source is divided into two types of data sources, namely primary and secondary data sources. Primary data were collected through observations based on activities and events in the field, in-depth interviews with informants and focus group discussions (FGD). Secondary data studied and examined in this study are documentation of the implementation of the state defence program, minutes of meetings between agencies, data from the media, general guidelines, study results from various literature and relevant previous studies.

Data validity test in this research is carried out through Triangulation, namely the data validity testing technique is done by checking the truth of the data obtained by researchers on

other parties that can be trusted. To maintain the validity of the data, efforts are made based on the principles of triangulation. In this study, triangulation was carried out at the data source, and used various supporting references to prove the data that the researcher had found such as interviews, and other supporting documents.

Discussion

Brown, Langer, and Stewart (2011) state that in the early days there might have been agreed "peace" but often occurred at a low or sporadic level, and often continued after a short period. In the Northern Ireland conflict, this took place within 15 years to arrive at a real peace situation, during this period there were still small conflicts carried out by rebel groups who were not ready to end the conflict. In other words, it takes a very long time and a sincere effort to move towards real peace.

However, in the case of Northern Ireland, the post-conflict situation lasted a very long time to arrive at the real conditions of peace, Brown et al. (2011) more not wanting to see one or other conditions to determine the beginning and end of "Post-conflict." According to them, a more productive approach to conceptualising post-conflict scenarios is to see it not as a period limited by a particular event, but as a process that involves achieving various peace milestones. Taking a process-oriented approach means countries in a "post-conflict" situation should be sawed from the length of a series of transitions.

In areas that are currently in post-conflict status as are currently underway in Ambon the war is indeed not happening, but according to Brahimi (2007), conditions during post-conflict do not describe real peace. The case in Ambon is like describing the real conditions from Brahimi's view because after the conflict in 1999 and the emergence of the Malino I peace agreement in 2001, and Malino II peace agreement in 2002; occurrence conflict broke out in 2003.

Post-conflict 2003 the peace agreement carried out, but the social conflict was a recurrence in 2011, 2012 and 2017. The recurrence of the conflict after the peace agreement shows that there is still a residual conflict amid Ambonese society, and in the end, the peace process seems to have not shown the real peace process.

According to Brahimi (2007) that the end of the battle does indeed propose an opportunity to work towards lasting peace, but it requires the establishment of sustainable institutions, which can guarantee long-term security. Establishment or involvement of institutions that specifically handle post-conflict situations considered necessary; these institutions will be a task in planning, prioritising, sorting and explaining their assistance carefully to maintain the transition to stability.

The importance of post-conflict rebuilding institutional infrastructure is not very important, but not more important than physical infrastructure institutional (Kumar, 1997) which largely has been overlooked by the international community in the past. In the implementation of the institutional infrastructure built to achieve peace must be able to serve the interests of the people, provide appropriate priorities, and help encourage the national interests of the local population.

Uvin (2000) considers development/peacebuilding in the post-conflict period based on three pillars: rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development. Busumtwi-Sam (2004) and White and Cliffe (2002) note three different approaches to post-conflict development; which include humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and sustainable conventional development. Referring to the stages and peace-building process proposed by experts, it is natural that the process of building peace in a conflict zone requires a considerable amount of time.

The case of Northern Ireland, which took 15 years after the conflict to arrive at real conditions of peace (Brown et al., 2011) and Liberia which took more than 8 years, since the peace agreement between 1997 and 2005. The General Auditing Commission (GAC) agency found that there still have to be measures to ensure that all stages of peacebuilding are underway. GAC in Liberia has the task of reintegrating social aspects that include recovery of victims, and economic aspects that include providing equal opportunities for everyone to get equal access to employment, education, and health (Gariba, 2011).

The research shows that the Ambon social conflicts during 1999-2003 remain residual conflict; led to the emergence of several subsequent conflicts in 2011 and 2017; although it was on a small scale. The Ambon situation could be categorised as post-conflict situations, due to considering residual conflict that could be trigger recurrence riots. Moreover, bad memory of conflict in most Ambonese communities, encourage by social and economic gaps and regions or villages segregation based on religion.

In Ambon Post-social conflict, the role of TNI-AD considered important; regarding the TNI-AD is not the main actor or the only institution tasked with maintaining national unity and regional security. The role of the TNI-AD in Ambon post-social conflict was Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW); where TNI was as executors of helping civil authorities and police institutions; shows that TNI has carried out its role well after the social conflict in Ambon. The role that carried out by the TNI post-social conflict in Ambon, running in the planning, coordination, communication and logistical fulfilment assistance aspects and all carried out and fulfilled by the TNI-AD.

In the planning aspect, the first thing that the TNI-AD did was conducting research and mapping of potential conflict areas in which the TNI-AD then made plans outlined in several

approaches. First, the deployment of the non-commissioned officer (at least two in one village) was effectively eliminating the possibility of security rumpus. Second, an organisational development plan to develop territorial commands and troop development to minimise potential conflicts. Finally, the TNI-AD conducts a social communication plan by approaching religious leaders, indigenous leaders, youths and academics with plans for state defence programs and other social activities programs. Based on the thoughts of Djuyandi (2017), he said that social communication by the military (TNI-AA) in overcoming security issues is also important. According to him, social communication is considered to be able to help the military in realising social integration in the midst of society.

The TNI-AD plans in handling post-social conflicts adjusted to the development of the community situation. In planning post-conflict handling, the TNI-AD prepared a plan for handling post-social conflicts related to the task of the TNI-AD assisting the Central and Regional Governments in planning Post-Conflict handling, and this is because in the previous process the TNI-AD took part in the following:

1. Stop physical violence;
2. Implement restrictions and closure of conflict areas for a while;
3. Temporarily limit people outside the home;
4. Ban people from entering conflict areas or temporarily leave the conflict area;
5. Rescue, evacuation, and identification of conflict victims;
6. Protection of vulnerable groups; and
7. Save people and property of conflict victims.

TNI-AD believes that planning for handling post-social conflict is important; so that the stages of handling the conflict become clearer, according to the intended goals and objectives. Planning to handle post-conflict social conflicts prepared by the TNI helps the Government and Local Governments in post-conflict planning according to developments in conflict areas, with no deadline for implementation of post-conflict management planning, because it is adapted to developments in the community.

In coordination terms, the TNI-AD has coordinated with the central government and local government and related stakeholders in efforts to deal with post-social conflict. First, TNI-AD is requesting The Regents and Governor in the status of regency/city and provincial due to scale conflict conditions to declare a civil emergency. The declaration led the TNI to take necessary action to control Ambon situation. Second, coordinate with relevant agencies to handle provocateurs and perpetrators of riots following applicable laws and conduct the deployment of non-commissioned officers in each Maluku Military District and North Maluku Military District to cover the need for territorial security. Third, synergise inter-group relations through cultural activities, customs, and territorial activities. Fourth, Carry out

intelligence activities to monitor the development of the situation and activities of the entire community and eliminate activities that can trigger conflict by participating in the Regional Leadership Consultative Forum.

In communication terms, to prevent the occurrence of social conflict in Ambon, the TNI has communicated with religious leaders, traditional leaders, youth and academics; through the Regional Leadership Consultative Forum that attended by all parties involved post-social conflict and communication by optimising the social media owned by the relevant parties including the community. In addition, informal communication was carried out to local kings, indigenous leaders and religious leaders; however, there is lack of intensity communication carried out by TNI personnel, especially the non-commissioned officer, public figures and religions.

In the logistics supply, TNI increases security personnel in post-conflict guarding operations. In addition, the TNI has channelled or provided assistance from the centre regarding logistical assistance in the form of basic needs and repairs to facilities and infrastructure, especially logistical support for housing repairs. Moreover, the TNI provides personnel's support as the members of the Regional Resistance Activities who have a role in carrying out the collection, preparation and inventory of Regional Resistance data consisting of Defense Area Planning and social communication. They also guide the development of Boy Scout as a media for youth; carry out the development of Territorial Net Distance Maps. The research shows that the TNI communication is not only formal communication instead of informal communication. If Takai theses require the existence of communication, the study reflects the capability of TNI to built a social approach.

Conclusion

Based on the study above, it can be concluded that the Ambon conflict is one of the worst social conflicts in post-independence history in Indonesia. A large number of victims and the extent of conflict areas indicate that this conflict has a very high level of escalation.

The involvement of the TNI in reducing conflict through a security and social approach carried out by the TNI proved to be able to prevent the occurrence of conflict on a larger scale. The military approach, especially territorial, as one of the TNI characteristically has proven to thrive in creating a more secure situation. The role of the TNI in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW); in the form of the planning, coordination, communication, and logistic fulfilment assistance aspects, and all are carried out and fulfilled by the TNI have shown optimal results.

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