Turkish – Israeli Co-operation and its Effect upon the Turkish – Iranian Relations 1996 -1997

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The second half of the 20th century has witnessed significant relation between Turkey and Israel. They have started by the Turkish recognition in the state of Israel after its establishment in 1949. Then, there is diplomatic exchange and culture ties and economic Co-operation. This reached the climax in the last decade of the 20th century between 1996-1997 when both parties have signed many agreements in the military and security field as well as exchanging intelligence expert and military manoeuvres. No doubt, these ties reaching this level has affected negatively on the ration of turkey with its neighbouring state Iran from its side has considered the Turkish-Israeli alliance might threaten directly its national security although there is a continuation of political and economic rations, taking into consideration not to raise problems on level of officials and in return Israel still looks at the development of relations between Turkey and the Arab states may affect negatively on its national and regional security and at the sometime Israel tries not to deepen the relations between Iran from one side and Syria and Lebanon from anther.

Key words: Effects on public affairs, military manoeuvres, public relations, Arab gulf affairs

Introduction

Turkey has different relations with the regional neighbouring countries, ranging from the establishment of strong alliances at the political, military and economic levels, and a break that sometimes reaches the armed clash, and this difference is related to the nature of the foreign policy of the Turkish Republic, since this republic has been established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and confirms his policy that is based On peace at home and abroad, however, what is noticed on Turkey's contemporary history is that this policy was drifting behind future political goals and objectives that Turkey's international relations may have a direct reason behind this
difference, at a time when Turkey appears to be a friendly neighbour to the Arabs not There are many developments in the forefront of which are history, culture and shared religion, which we find drifting behind the establishment of close relations with Israel, the first enemy of the Arabs, and this conversation includes relations with neighbouring Iran, and it seems that the Turkish rush to Europe and its desire to be a member of the European Union stands behind this duplication, as well as the case in relations With Russia and Greece, which fluctuates according to the external conditions of Turkish politics.

What concerns us in this research is the relationship between Turkey and Israel and the impact of this relationship on Turkish-Iranian relations, as it is known that the last decade of the twentieth century has produced a great rapprochement between Turkey and Israel and good friendship with Iran, noting that there is a clear hostility between Iran and Israel, This hypothesis is where we will start from to study the dimensions of the topic, and accordingly we will divide the research into two topics, the first deals with the development of Turkish-Israeli relations to the military and security agreement, while the second topic will address the effects of this relationship on Turkish-Iranian relations.

The Development of Turkish-Israeli Relations

Most researchers and scholars agree that the reason behind the Turkish rapprochement with Israel is Turkey's desire to win the favour of Western countries through its urgent request to join the European Union, and that it is a member of NATO (Al-Naimi, no date), at the same time that Israel was seeking to win Islamic countries On its side, and this means that Turkey was of the view that strengthening its relations with Israel is a strong impetus for its approach to the European and American West, and in return, Israel sees in Turkey a bridge linking it to the Islamic region that does not recognize the State of Israel, as it seeks to take advantage of the Turkish advantages in the region, especially in The genies Economic such as water and trade, even oil if Turkey played the role of mediator (Darwish, 2002: 127).

And based on the foregoing, these relations were not going at the same pace, but rather they differed from one period to another according to the common interests and effects of foreign policy of both countries. At a time when Turkey vehemently opposed the decision to partition Palestine that was approved by the United Nations General Assembly in 1947, it allowed in the year Next to (30) thousand Turkish Jews out of 80 thousand by immigration to Palestine, (Darwish, 2002: 128) After another year, specifically on March 28, 1949, Turkey officially recognized the establishment of the State of Israel, (afwat, 1982: 93) and despite Turkey's justification for this recognition that it is to confront the communist threat (Nuruaddin, 1997a: 273).
However, the relations gained a clear development in the period 1950-1960, when diplomatic missions and military attachments were exchanged and economic and cultural agreements were signed.

In the year 1950 AD, an extraordinary ambassador to Turkey was appointed in Tal Aviv and signed several secret and public trade agreements in the same year with the start of cultural cooperation between the Middle East University of Technology in Ankara and the ninth agricultural source of the Hebrew University. The purpose of this cooperation was to provide Israeli expertise to Turkish teachers and students (Darwish, 2002: 132) In the commercial field, the volume of exchange increased from one million pounds in 1952 to 65 pounds in 1953, after the signing of a set of agreements, and this was the prelude to a clear development in political relations reflected in the invitation of Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (1950-1960) to the right of Israel In establishing its state in Palestine Yen (Robins, 1993: 95). However, relations fell back after the Suez Canal was nationalized by Egypt in 1956 and exposed it to a military aggression in which a British, France and Israel participated, as Turkey stood by Egypt and reduced its diplomatic representation with Israel to the level of the delegate, (Darwish, 2002: 132) It seems that the Turkish position to Far from the Cyprus crisis, in which the United States and Europe sided with Greece, (Moawad, 1996: 132) and Turkey felt that it needed the Arab position, so it began to re balance its relations with the Arabs. (Robins, 1993: 97) This trend was supported by the arrival of the Justice Party headed by Suleiman Demirel to power several times (1965-1969) - (1969-1970) - (1970-1971), and adopts a policy of rapprochement with countries Arabic. (Moawad, 1996: 133).

The seriousness of the new Turkish position was confirmed after the dangerous developments in the Arab arena, after the escalating situation in the Arab-Israeli conflict escalated, where Israel suddenly occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan, after June 5, 1967, and as a result Turkey refused Joining the group of maritime states that demanded the reopening of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships and supported the Arab position in this war and issued a statement endorsing International Resolution No. 242, which called for the withdrawal of Israel from the lands it occupied, and did not allow the United States to use Prepared in Turkey to help Israel (Al-Nasiri, 1990: 200-204; Robins, 1993: 98). Turkey has publicly criticized Israel through its Foreign Minister, Jackley Gul, who said, "We regret with great regret not to abide by the decisions to stop the fighting issued by the UN Security Council, especially the continuation of fighting on the Syrian-Israeli front, and then called for Israel to withdraw from the lands it occupied." (Darwish, 2002: 133) Turkey added to its positive position, this is its vote with the United Nations resolution against the administrative annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel. (Nuruddin, 1998b: 199) This position was also repeated after the conflict was renewed again in 1973, in which the Arab forces launched an offensive to liberate the lands that had previously been occupied, and this tension was accompanied by a significant increase in oil prices and a global economic crisis, which led to Turkey being
affected greatly by these developments due to its having to resort to a fund International Monetary Fund to compensate for its losses from high oil prices (Robins, 1993: 121) Turkey has added a new position, which is its support for the United Nations General Assembly Resolution in 1975 AD, considering Zionism as a form of racism and its recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a representative of the Palestinian movement and allowed the organization to open an office in Turkey in 1979 AD It seems that Turkey's fear of using the oil weapon against it was behind this Positions, as Turkey joined the membership of the Islamic Conference in 1976. (Darwish, 2002: 137-138).

However, Turkey's policy that is close to Arab issues would not last long. Turkey is still that secular country with a Western approach to management and politics. Therefore, the aspiration of Turkish leaders was and is still getting closer to Europe and joining the European group economically and politically, and for this reason Turkey was not putting itself in the confrontation With Western policy, it began with the end of the seventies and the early eighties, adopting a new approach that is closer to neutrality with a preference for its national interests. Accordingly, she followed a neutral stance on the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) at the same time that she was benefiting from both warring parties to strengthen its economy. (Al-Allaf, 1999c: 10) It also refused to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 1980 AD and condemned Israel's bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and the invasion Israeli forces in southern Lebanon in 1988, but at the same time they maintained diplomatic relations with Israel, and new security and intelligence cooperation emerged between them that contributed to the displacement of Iranian Jews to Israel, (Moawad, 1996: 136) On the other hand, Turkey cooperated secretly or publicly with many parties that were (Al-Allaf, 1999c: 10). It is considered a contribution to prolonging the Iraq-Iran war Of like the United States, for example.

Emphasizing the policy of neutrality that Turkey pursued at this stage, it re-established its diplomatic representation with Israel in 1983 and ambassadors exchanged and this came after Israel provided Turkey with documents it seized during its invasion of Lebanon indicating that Turkish Marxist extremists are receiving military training in the PLO bases. (Darwish, 2002: 139).

Turkey has continued its convergent approach with Israel during the coming years, until the eightieth decade is the beginning of a strong start for a Turkish-Israeli alliance that began politically and diplomatically, then economically, covering the fields of the armed forces and intelligence, in addition to cooperation in the field of information and administration (Al-Allaf, 1998b: 205-208) Turkey considered the development of this policy from Its side is to protect its national security against any threats that may be issued by foreign countries, and Turkey aims to do so precisely Iraq and Syria, which it accused of supporting groups of the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party, which is conducting military operations against Turkey, demanding
the independence of the Kurdish region in southern Turkey, as well as Syria. The ongoing reintroduction of the Alexandra Brigade to its sovereignty (Al-Allaf, 1994a: 150-160).

The political events and developments in the relationship between Turkey and Israel, which he once mentioned, were a strong basis for building a political and military security and economic alliance between the two parties during the last decade of the twentieth century and the features of this alliance started to emerge with the start of the second Gulf War in 1991 AD, as Turkey entered among the allies of the United States. The United States in its war against Iraq and removing its forces from Kuwait and then imposing a comprehensive international blockade (Neama, 1997: 10) on it, and based on the foregoing, relations with Israel have also evolved to our knowledge that Israel is the first ally of the United States and security political arrangements between the United States have become Israel and Turkey participate in it as a strong ally. (Muawad, 1997: 118) This helped the Turkish rush to Israel, due to the turmoil in relations between Turkey on the one hand, and Iraq and Syria on the other, due to the exacerbation of water, border and minority problems. (Mustafa, 1995: 193).

In fact, the increase in rapprochement between Turkey and Israel has been greatly affected by the disruption of relations with the Arab neighbours, but we do not lose sight of the influence of Western and American pressure, which sees its interest is the presence of strong relations between Turkey and Israel, which strengthens Israel's position among the Arab countries, adding to that Turkish ambition to join to the European Community and an ambitious passion, Turkey believes that its achievement is facilitated by following the current policy. Accordingly, Turkey has started in great measures to establish a true alliance with Israel, which it has started with establishing the Southeast Anatolia Project, which means practically seizing all water from Iraq and Syria and controlling it from a Turkey, besides announcing the establishment of the peace project, which aims to deliver water from Turkey to Israel, thus Turkey has opened a political front with Iraq and Syria that may develop into a confrontation. (Neama, 1997: 21).

After the second Gulf War, the Turkish-Israeli relations witnessed a clear development, and the conditions of the international blockade on Iraq contributed to strengthening these relations, as there was a Western desire to reduce Iraq’s role and destroy its military power, and this is a positive thing for Israel, which in return will seek to win other countries to On its side, especially Turkey, and accordingly, the period 1992-1994 witnessed many visits by Turkish and Israeli officials, in which the two parties concluded the strategic cooperation agreement in 1993. (Nuruddin, 1998: 266).

This agreement was the cornerstone of wide relations between the two parties and reached its most dangerous aspects in 1996 when the two sides signed an agreement for military cooperation, which includes exchanging military experiences, armament, conducting military exercises and assisting both parties to each other when wars break out, and this constitutes an
explicit threat to the Arab neighbourhood countries that will be facing Military with Turkey and Israel if the relationship with one of them (Muawad, 1998: 26-27). On the other hand, the economic field witnessed a great development in the conclusion of mutual agreements and treaties between the two parties, the most important of which was the free trade agreement in March 1996 and the agreement on cooperation in the field of land transport and the export of water and other economic projects (Muawad, 1998: 22). This was followed by the signing of agreements attached to the military agreement such as the one that was signed On August 28, 1996 the cooperation in the military industry and exchange in the technical field dealt with the right to another agreement that included the exchange of security and military intelligence experiences and assistance on December 1, 1996, which clearly indicates that the Arab region is confined between Israel Turkey, including Iraq, has become a common security area for Turkey and Israel, which means freedom of action in the future to protect their national security, according to their claim. (Al-Allaf, 1998b: 27).

The Impact of Turkish-Israeli Cooperation on Turkish-Iranian Relations

The Iranian-Turkish relations are considered an important topic that has been studied for many decades by many researchers and scholars, due to the political and economic weight enjoyed by the two countries in the region. The relations between them witnessed many fluctuations, alternating between rapprochement and understanding and the difference that reached the point of outbreak. The many wars between them that greatly affected the map and conditions of the Middle East, especially in modern times during the rule of the Ottoman states in Turkey and the Safavid in Iran, and at the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century two new systems arose in the two countries, one of which is a republic in Turkey and the other is royal. In Iran, however, they followed a Western approach to administration and governance.

As far as our issue is concerned, the Iranian-Turkish relations began to witness many changes after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and its success in building a new state on the Islamic republican system, which made Turkey deal with the new situation in a manner that depends to a large extent on wisdom and winning Iran to its side and trying Not to engage with it in tensions or disputes, and accordingly, Turkey quickly recognized the new Iranian regime and in return, it tried to develop its relations with its neighbours from the Arab countries, after it was rumoured in the global political circles that Iran would try to export its revolution to neighbouring countries, which poses a danger to The secular system in Turkey. (Darwish, 2002: 267-268) However, it is not possible to overlook the existence of some problems and differences of opinion between the two parties during this period (Darwish, 2002: 70). Perhaps the most prominent difference in opinion is the position towards Israel, as Turkey sees an independent state in Israel with which it can have relations based on common interests, unlike Iran, which sees in Israel a traditional enemy representing colonialism and global arrogance,
and for this, Iran stood by Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance movements. Of the Israeli occupation. (Darwish, 2002: 267).

Turkish-Iranian relations have been greatly affected by Turkey's position on Israel, despite these relations having started friendly after the Islamic Revolution and the agreement of both parties not to interfere in the affairs of the other and prevented each of the movements and organizations rebelling against their governments, but this does not prevent that Iran was not He was comfortable with the Western secular system applied in Turkey, and as happened in the case of the Turkish government preventing MP (Marwa Qawqji) from attending the Turkish Parliament sessions due to her wearing the veil, as Iran denounced the matter and the demonstrations in support of the parliamentarian went out, and Turkey considered this an interference in its affairs. (Darwish, 2002: 268-269).

Najmuddin Erbakan's victory in the Turkish elections and his formation of his first government for the period (June 1996 - June 1997) came as a change in the foreign policy of the two countries due to the Islamic orientations of Erbakan. Erbakan confirmed this opinion, as he made his first visit outside Turkey to Iran less than two months after receiving it On 10 August 1996, he headed the government, and during the visit, he affirmed the depth of historical, cultural and political relations between the two countries despite the strong opposition announced by the United States and Israel, as the first threatened to punish Turkey for implementing the Damato Law, but Erbakan stressed that this visit is not directed against The United States, but that the visit came to develop relations between the two neighbouring countries, especially the economic side, where Erbakan signed with the Iranian leaders an agreement to supply Turkey with natural gas to Iran on 12 August 1996 over a period of 23 years, in exchange for exporting Iranian gas to Turkey starting in 1999 and in quantities It reaches 3 billion cubic meters annually and reaches 10 billion cubic meters in 2005. (Darwish, 2002: 271-272) The Israeli and American influence on Turkey has played an important role in postponing the implementation of this deal later.

During this period of Erbakan taking power in Turkey and trying to build strong relations with Arab and Islamic countries, Turkey was developing its relations at a high level with Israel, which reached the signing of military and security agreements between them, and Iran has strongly opposed these agreements and considered them a blow to Arabs and Muslims before An Islamic state. (Darwish, 2002: 283-284) Despite the optimism of a number of Israeli officials that Muhammad Khatami had reached the presidency of Iran and trying to describe him as a friend of the West and that his reign would be the beginning of the normalization of Iranian-Israeli relations, Khatami declared that Israel was the first enemy of Iran, which kept the door in Open to the continuation of bad relations between them. (Robins, 1993: 72).
Accordingly, Israel considered developing its relations with Turkey a great contribution to facing the Iranian threat, especially after Iran succeeded in developing its long-range missiles, which reach a range of 1300 km, which prompted the United States to conclude an agreement with Israel to produce new aircraft that are prepared to strike Iran in the future, and officials stated The Israelis explicitly stated that they would strike the Iranian nuclear reactor as they struck the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 (Mohamed, 1997: 213). For the same reasons, Israel considered signing its military and security agreement with Turkey as an opportunity to approach the Iranian borders, as it sees it, that Iran is close to its borders, because of its relations with Syria and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. (Darwish, 2002: 83) It seems that these statements do not depart from the truth. Turkish Chief of Staff Ismail Hakki Qara Daei said after his visit to Israel on February 24, 1997 that among the things that will be discussed with the Israeli military is the presence of Iranian Scud missiles in Syria, and that they may reach Lebanese Hezbollah guerrillas, which poses a great threat to Israeli security, at the same time, Turkey sees the danger of these missiles on its security in the event that they fall into the hands of PKK elements, and these statements have caused great Iranian concern and fear of forming a Turkish-Israeli alliance against it, especially after continuing visits Between diplomats and the Israelis military and Turks, who emphasized that both Syria and Iran threaten Turkey and Israel (Olsen, 2001: 85-86).

These statements constituted Iranian anger through the media, which confirmed that Turkey did not encourage the establishment of good neighborly relations. Tehran was alarmed by the statements of the Turkish military, led by Defense Minister Turhan Tayan, who said that Iran and Syria are making chemical weapons with self-propelled weapons, and Iranian newspapers said that these statements contradict With Prime Minister Erbakan's efforts to pursue an independent policy. (Olsen, 2001: 88).

One of the reasons for the signing of the Turkish-Israeli military alliance was Turkey's desire to help Israel to contain the PKK, which Turkey believes Iran and Syria are providing support for, but in return, this alliance contributed to a significant development of military and security relations between Iran and Syria and the fact that the Labour Party issue was the same Negative impact on Iranian-Turkish relations as Turkey entered Iranian territory more than once to chase the elements of the party that Iran refuses to invite to provide assistance to, then came the issue of student unrest in Iran to add a new crisis to their relations where he accused the president Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president of Turkey and the new Minister Bulent Ecevit (June 1997-2003) his support for these demonstrations and a reference to Turkey's desire to support the rioters. (Darwish, 2002: 289-290) In spite of the interaction of previous events and the subsequent expulsion of a Turkish diplomat in March 1997 AD, former Turkish President Suleiman Demirel (1993-2000 AD) dispatched Ali Do, Undersecretary of State, a special envoy carrying his condolences to the Iranian people on the earthquake that struck the city of Ardabil on February 28. In 1997 AD, he met the Iranian Foreign Minister for Asia and
the Pacific, who thanked Turkey, affirming that it indicated the importance of relations with the countries. On the same day, Hassan Rahim, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, stated that the problems that had arisen in the relations between Tehran and Ankara were behind the conspiracies of the United States. (Olsen, 2001: 90-91).

Conclusions

1. Turkey is a country of regional neighbourhood for the Levant countries with political and economic weight in the region, and Turkey's influence exceeds most of the Middle East region in addition to historical and cultural ties with the countries of the region, especially Islamic ones, as it has a significant economic impact, especially in the field of water export, as most of the region's water stem from it.

2. As for Israel, it is a modern country that was planted by force in the heart of the Middle East and is linked to a historical and political hostility with the Arab and Islamic countries. Therefore, its conflict with Turkey after direct pressure on these countries, and determining the status of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Iran between the jaws of pliers.

3. As for Iran, it is the strongest country in the region with its long history and enormous economic and human potential. It is connected with Turkey with deep-rooted relations ranging from the armed clash between them and the common alliance. In both cases, their impact has a great dimension on the region.

4. The issue of the existence of a rapprochement that amounts to the conclusion of military, security and intelligence alliances and the conduct of military manoeuvres will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the ties that link Turkey and Iran to what is known about Iran as its direct hostility to Israel and its non-recognition of its state, which constitutes a danger that approaches the Iranian border as it is Israel believes that Iran threatens its security by having Iranian relations with Syria, Lebanon and the Islamic parties that resist Israel in Lebanon and Palestine.
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